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RETHINKING WORK PRODUCT
Elizabeth Thornburg*
THE work product doctrine is the result of a monumental clash in
the values underlying modem civil litigation.' On the one hand,
we cling to an adversarial model. Thus envisioned, the lawsuit is a
battle between opposing armies, each side preparing independently
and each attorney having no duty but to represent zealously his or her
own client.2 This model stresses individual initiative, discourages
cooperation, and does nothing to modify within the litigation process
the inequities in wealth and information that exist outside the litiga-
tion process.
On the other hand, since the advent of modem pretrial discovery,
we also have embraced a different vision of civil litigation. Discovery
is a nonadversarial element injected into an adversarial system.3 Dis-
covery acts to correct an inherent flaw in an adversarial system-the
unequal distribution of information relevant to the dispute4 -by
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William and Mary; J.D., 1979, Southern Methodist University. I would like to thank Linda
Eads, Tom Mengler, and Fred Moss for commenting on earlier drafts of this Article, and Greg
Crespi for sharing his insights into law and economics analysis.
I Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, 45 F.R.D. 479, 481 (1968) (remarks given
by Maurice Rosenberg at the Ninth Ann. Postgraduate Conf. of the Columbia Law School
Alumni Ass'n).
2 In the prediscovery, purely adversarial system,
[t]he conception of justice has always been subordinate to the conception of the law suit
as a game between opposing counsel .... [B]oth sides conduct their operations with as
great a measure of secrecy as possible .... The bar has viewed with suspicion any
attempts to destroy this secrecy .... An open consideration of the facts has not seemed
to be a primary aim of the game.
James A. Pike & John W. Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure, 38
Colum. L. Rev. 1179, 1180 (1938) (footnote omitted). For a history of the development of the
adversary system, see Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary
System, 64 Ind. L.J. 301, 319-26 (1989).
3 See Sward, supra note 2, at 328 (noting that discovery involves loss of party control and
more active involvement of the decisionmaker than the traditional adversarial model).
4 "For anyone who is concerned with justice, the most salient feature of contemporary
American society is the wildly unequal distribution of wealth and power. Only the complacent
or the ideologically blinded can avoid the issue of the complicity of rules of procedure in
fostering inequality." Kenneth W. Graham, The Persistence of Progressive Proceduralism, 61
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requiring a sharing of all such relevant information prior to trial.5
This nonadversarial model stresses a joint effort at arriving at a cor-
rect result, requires cooperation in the information-gathering process,
and modifies within the litigation process some of the inequities in
information that exist outside the litigation process. To the extent
that it is costly for one of the parties to develop information that must
be turned over to its adversary, the discovery process also leads to
some shift in wealth.
Faced with the clash between these models and their underlying
values, courts and rulemakers had to decide what to do with "work
product"-material generated in connection with the process of inves-
tigating and resolving disputes, material generated by attorneys, attor-
neys' agents, the parties, and the parties' agents, with litigation at
least a glimmer in their minds. Parties, accustomed to acting as
adversaries, did not want to turn over to their opponents either harm-
ful information or information that had been expensive to compile.
The system resolved this problem by creating work product immu-
nity. Generally speaking, the work product doctrine protects-allows
opponents to hide during discovery-tangible and intangible informa-
tion generated in anticipation of litigation. Only an adversarial model
can explain the work product doctrine: it promotes individual, unco-
operative action,6 it values secrecy and surprise,7 and it refuses to
allow a transfer of information or wealth between the parties.
Tex. L. Rev. 929, 948 (1983) (reviewing Julius B. Levine, Discovery: A Comparison Between
English and American Civil Discovery Law with Reform Proposals (1982)).
5 Sunderland wrote at the time that discovery was intended as an information redistribution
device. Edson R. Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules, 15 Tenn.
L. Rev. 737, 739 (1939) ("Each party may in effect be called upon by his adversary or by the
judge to lay all his cards upon the table, the important consideration being who has the
stronger hand, not who can play the cleverer game."); see also Arthur B. LaFrance, Work-
Product Discovery: A Critique, 68 Dick. L. Rev. 351, 351 (1964) (stating that the discovery
rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were an attempt to put "unequal opponents on a
more equal footing"); Sward, supra note 2, at 329 (arguing that discovery is an attempt to
"overcome the.., inequality of information-that undermines adversarial fact-finding").
6 Supporters of work product immunity firmly believe that "[t]he strength of the adversary
system as an effective means of eliciting truth and pursuing justice lies in the force with which
the contending parties pursue their self-interest, thereby generating a truthful verdict." Note,
Protection of Opinion Work Product Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 64 Va. L.
Rev. 333, 334 (1978) (footnote omitted).
7 See, e.g., City of Long Beach v. Superior Ct., 134 Cal. Rptr. 468, 474 (Ct. App. 1976)
("We are not convinced that the sporting theory of litigation must be so entirely eliminated.").
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Earlier commentators have noted that particular facets of work
product immunity are unnecessary, such as the protection of ordinary
trial preparation materials,8 witness statements, 9 and materials used
in subsequent litigation. 10 Work product protection also has recent
advocates, most notably a new defense from the law and economics
perspective.II
This Article, however, takes a different approach, arguing that
work product immunity should be eliminated entirely. Neither the
traditional utilitarian justifications for work product immunity nor
their modem-day law and economics counterparts are theoretically or
empirically sound. Work product immunity is not needed to protect
the adversary system or the legal profession. Rather, it results in the
suppression of relevant information and in the imposition of gigantic
transaction costs on the parties and the judicial system.
Worse, work product protection has an uneven effect on litigants.
In theory, the work product doctrine is an evenhanded doctrine.
After all, by the time a dispute results in litigation, everyone has an
attorney, so everyone has work product. In operation, however, the
work product doctrine is not evenhanded. It works to benefit institu-
tional litigants at the expense of individual litigants and to benefit fre-
quent litigants at the expense of "one-shot" litigants. 12
Work product immunity is unsound in theory, unfair in operation,
and immensely costly to litigants and society. Legitimate concerns
about the timing of litigation, cost-sharing, or attorney behavior can
be addressed directly, but the current draconian work product doc-
trine must go.
8 See Edward H. Cooper, Work Product of the Rulesmakers, 53 Minn. L. Rev. 1269 (1969).
9 See Kathleen Waits, Work Product Protection for Witness Statements: Time for
Abolition, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 305.
10 See D. Christopher Wells, The Attorney Work Product Doctrine and Carry-Over
Immunity: An Assessment of Their Justifications, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 675 (1986).
11 See Ronald J. Allen, Mark F. Grady, Daniel D. Polsby & Michael S. Yashko, A Positive
Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 19 J. Legal Stud. 359
(1990) [hereinafter Positive Theory].
12 For the first use of this terminology, see Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y Rev. 95 (1974).
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I. OvERVIEw: HISTORY AND COVERAGE
Before the 1939 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there was virtu-
ally no discovery in actions at law and little discovery in equity.13
The general unavailability of discovery procedures obviated the need
to raise the specific issue of whether an attorney's trial preparations
were discoverable.14  Moreover, in their original form, the Federal
Rules offered no protection to the material collected by an attorney,
to the attorney's mental impressions developed in the course of prepa-
ration for trial,'5 or to other trial preparation materials. In the decade
following the enactment of the Federal Rules, the courts disagreed as
to whether such material should be discoverable. One line of cases
allowed discovery.' 6 Other cases allowed discovery of attorney inves-
tigations,17 communications between counsel and other parties,' 8 and
accident reports.' 9
13 For valuable discussions of the status of discovery prior to the federal rules, see George
Ragland, Jr., Discovery Before Trial (1932); James A. Gardner, Privilege and Discovery:
Background and Development in English and American Law, 53 Geo. L.J. 585 (1965);
LaFrance, supra note 5, at 353-56; Robert W. Millar, The Mechanism of Fact-Discovery: A
Study in Comparative Civil Procedure, 32 Ill. L. Rev. 424, 437-52 (1937); Edson R.
Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure, 36 Mich. L. Rev. 215 (1937);
Edson R. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 Yale L.J. 863 (1933);
Leland L. Tolman, Discovery Under the Federal Rules: Production of Documents and the
Work Product of the Lawyer, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 498 (1958); Developments in the Law-
Discovery, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 940, 946-50 (1961) [hereinafter Developments].
14 See LaFrance, supra note 5, at 356.
15 See Caroline T. Mitchell, Note, The Work Product Doctrine in Subsequent Litigation, 83
Colum. L. Rev. 412, 416 (1983).
16 See, e.g., Bough v. Lee, 28 F. Supp. 673, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (allowing discovery of
statements and photographs taken by an investigating insurance company). For a general
discussion of the pre-Hickman v. Taylor cases decided under the federal rules, see Jeff A.
Anderson, Gena E. Cadieux, George E. Hays, Michael B. Hingerty & Richard J. Kaplan,
Special Project, The Work Product Doctrine, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 760, 765-73 (1983)
[hereinafter Special Project].
17 See, e.g., Kane v. News Syndicate Co., 1 F.R.D. 738, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
18 See, e.g., Leach v. Greif Bros. Cooperage Corp., 2 F.R.D. 444, 446 (S.D. Miss. 1942);
E.W. Bliss Co. v. Cold Metal Process Co., 1 F.R.D. 193, 195 (N.D. Ohio 1940).
19 See, e.g., Terrell v. Standard Oil Co., 9 Fed. R. Serv. (Callaghan) 599 (E.D. Pa. 1945);
Topolinsky v. Palmer, 8 Fed. R. Serv. (Callaghan) 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); Farr v. Delaware, L.
& W.R.R., 8 Fed. R. Serv. (Callaghan) 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Eiseman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 3
F.R.D. 338, 339-40 (E.D. Pa. 1944); Stark v. American Dredging Co., 3 F.R.D. 300, 302
(E.D. Pa. 1943).
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Then, in 1947, the United States Supreme Court decided Hickman
v. Taylor.20 In Hickman, the Court created a qualified immunity from
discovery for attorney work product prepared in anticipation of litiga-
tion.21 Hickman was decided at a time when discovery looked quite
different than it looks now.22 For example, many changes broadening
discovery that litigators now take for granted had not yet occurred.23
Developments in discovery practices since Hickman, then, have
changed the environment in which discovery occurs and have greatly
expanded the scope of exchange of nonprivileged information that is
now commonplace in civil litigation. One might question whether the
Court, if faced with the work product question for the first time in
1992, would have the same fears that it had in 1947.24 Nevertheless,
20 329 U.S. 495 (1947). For a factual account of the events leading to the Supreme Court's
decision in Hickman, see Paul Coady, Dredging the Depths of Hickman v. Taylor, Harv. L.
Rec., May 6, 1977, at 2.
21 Because Hickman was decided at a time when the discovery rules were quite new and still
controversial, one commentator has suggested that the recognition of work product immunity
was a political compromise to gain the cooperation of the bar in accepting the new discovery
machinery. Cooper, supra note 8, at 1273.
22 The year before Hickman, in 1946, the rules of procedure had only just been amended to:
(1) eliminate the need for leave of court before a deposition could be taken; (2) make clear
that discovery could be had not only of evidence to be used at trial but also of matters that
could lead to the discovery of such evidence; (3) make clear that interrogatories had the same
broad scope as depositions and could be used after depositions were taken; and (4) make clear
that admissions could be used for facts other than those set forth in relevant documents
described in and exhibited with the request for admission. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory
committee's notes (1946 amendments).
23 At the time Hickman was decided, all requests for document production required court
approval and a showing of good cause. The plaintiff's attorney in Hickman had tried instead
to secure copies of witness statements by using interrogatories. The Supreme Court did not
rest its decision on this procedural irregularity. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 505. It seems likely,
however, that counsel's attempt to obtain documents without meeting the then-current good
cause requirement made the Court even more skeptical of the discovery request. Discovery
from organizational litigants also was more limited, because there was no procedure for
naming a corporation or other form of organization as a deponent in the notice of examination
and for requiring the deponent to produce witnesses who possessed the relevant information.
Also, significant lines of case law existed limiting both interrogatories and requests for
admissions to "facts," prohibiting questions of mixed law and fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26,
advisory committee's notes (1970 amendments). Pretrial procedures requiring disclosure of
contentions, trial witnesses, and exhibits were also unheard of. Small wonder, then, that the
request in Hickman for witness statements drafted by an attorney, unaccompanied by any
claim of good cause, seemed out of line to the Court. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 504-05.
24 Changes in discovery practice weaken arguments about the negative effects of discovery
of trial preparation materials. See infra Part II.A. Yet the Court's recent decisions, relying on
Hickman, have continued to endorse work product immunity. See, e.g., Upjohn v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). By contrast, in the criminal context the Court has begun to
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following twenty-three years of often-conflicting case law25 and sev-
eral abortive attempts at rule drafting, the Court in 1970 amended the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to include a specific discovery
exemption for trial preparation materials.26
Rule 26(b)(3) protects from discovery relevant "documents and
tangible things... prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by
or for another party or by or for that other party's representative
(including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor,
insurer, or agent)."' 27 Both Hickman and Rule 26(b)(3) envision a
hierarchy of protection: (1) facts contained in work product, which
are discoverable if a litigant can figure out the right question to ask;
(2) ordinary work product, which is discoverable on a showing of
substantial need and undue hardship; and (3) opinion work product,
which is rarely, if ever, discoverable.
This expansive federal model has had a strong influence on state
discovery rules.28 Thirty-four states have work product exemptions
that are verbatim copies of Rule 26(b)(3). 29 The work product rules
of ten more states vary slightly in wording from the federal rule but
emphasize the importance of truth-seeking. See, e.g., Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S.
681 (1988); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
25 For a description of the cases between Hickman and the adoption of Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(3), see Special Project, supra note 16, at 780-84.
26 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
27 Id. The rule is only a partial codification because it explicitly covers only tangible work
product. Kevin M. Clermont, Surveying Work Product, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 755, 757-58
(1983). The contours of Rule 26(b)(3) also differ from Hickman regarding issues such as the
range of persons whose work can constitute work product and the strictness of the anticipation
of litigation requirement. The rationales offered by cases and commentators, however, for
Rule 26(b)(3) and the Hickman rule are the same, so that this Article's critique of the work
product doctrine is applicable to both.
28 For an extremely thorough discussion of the parameters of existing work product
doctrine, see Special Project, supra note 16, at 788-893.
29 See Ala. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Alaska R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Ark. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Colo. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Del. Ct. C.P.R. 26(b)(3); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(3);
Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-26(b)(3) (Michie 1982); Haw. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Ind. R. Trial P.
26(b)(3); Iowa R. Civ. P. 122(c); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-226(b)(3) (1984); Ky. R. Civ. P.
26.02(3); Me. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Mass. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Miss. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Mont.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Neb. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Nev. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); N.H. Super. Ct. R.
35(b)(2); N.J. Civ. Practice R. 4:10-2(c); N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-026(b)(4); N.D. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3);
Or. R. Civ. P. 36(B).(3); S.C. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 15-6-26(b)(3)
(1984); Tenn. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Vt. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Va. S. Ct.
R. 4:1(b)(3); Wash. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 26(b)(3); W. Va. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Wis. R. Civ. P.
804.01(2)(c); Wyo. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
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appear to be functionally the same as the federal rule.30 The result is
that a very protective work product rule applies to almost all civil
litigation.31
More important than the technical contours of the doctrine32 is its
impact on the information flow. Before we can reach a conclusion
about the desirability of the immunity,33 we need to know what infor-
mation is being shielded from discovery. Reported cases from state
and federal courts reveal that work product disputes tend to center on
a predictable array of ordinary and opinion work product.34 In the
30 See Conn. Super. Ct. R. § 219 (omitting some of the language in the federal rule); Idaho
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (containing additional language concerning attorney-client communi-
cations); La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 1424 (West 1984) (interpreting override standard the
same as the federal standard in Ogea v. Jacobs, 344 So. 2d 953, 957 (La. 1977), but opinion
work product absolute only for attorneys and experts); Md. Cir. Ct. R. Civ. P. 2-402(c) & (d)
(minor wording differences); Mich. Ct. R. 2.302(B)(3) (same); Minn. R. Civ. P. 26.02(c)
(same); Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3) (omitting nonparty right to copy of own statement); N.C.
Gen. Stat. § IA -1, R. 26(b)(3) (1990) (limiting opinion work product to same action); Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 12 § 3226(B)(2) (West. Supp. 1991) (minor wording differences); R.I. Super. Ct.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) (override standard of "injustice and undue hardship" similar to federal
standard of Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. McAlpine, 391 A.2d 84, 87-88, 90 (R.I. 1978)).
31 Six other states have opted for either more or less protection. For example, California
protects work product that is not generated in anticipation of litigation-the so-called
"counselor work product." See Rumac, Inc. v. Bottomley, 192 Cal. Rptr. 104 (Ct. App. 1983).
Pennsylvania and Texas, on the other hand, are less protective of work product than the
federal rules. See Pa. R. Civ. P. 4003.3 (protecting only pure opinion work product); Axelson,
Inc. v. Mcllhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tex. 1990) (interpreting Tex. R. Civ. P. Ann. r.
166b(3) (West Supp. 1991) as protecting only pure opinion work product and finding
anticipation of litigation only after an objective manifestation of intent to sue by the potential
plaintiff); Flores v. Fourth Ct. App., 777 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tex. 1989) (same). Other states
having different models for work product rules are Illinois, New York, and Ohio. See Ill. S.
Ct. R. 201(b)(2); N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 3101 (McKinney 1990); Ohio R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
32 Even within the common framework, there are variations at the edges. For example,
courts disagree about the parameters of the anticipation of litigation requirement, about work
product in subsequent litigation, about agency issues, about the showing required to overcome
the qualified work product immunity, and about waiver issues. See generally James P. Garrity,
Discovery of an Insurer's Files: Now You See It, Now You Don't, 20 Forum 20, 22-30 (1984)
(discussing state and federal cases regarding the anticipation of litigation, substantial need, and
undue hardship requirements); Special Project, supra note 16 (discussing court variations).
33 See infra Part III for a discussion of the impact of allowing work product protection of
certain kinds of information.
34 Opinion work product includes "an attorney's strategy, including his intended lines of
proof and cross-examination plans. 'Opinion work product' also encompasses an attorney's
evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of his case and the inferences he has drawn from
interviews of witnesses." Note, supra note 6, at 333 (footnotes omitted). Ordinary work
product includes work product that does not disclose such attorney thought processes. See
Special Project, supra note 16, at 791 n.196.
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category of ordinary work product, courts have given work product
immunity for witness statements, 35 investigators' reports, 36 insurance
files, 37 surveillance videotapes, 38 communications other than between
attorney and client,39 photographs of relevant locations or objects,"
sketches and diagrams," and, less frequently, computerized litigation
support systems.42 There is less case law on opinion work product,
perhaps because it is less often requested. 43 Courts have given work
product immunity, however, for attorney notes reflecting witness
35 See, e.g., Colorado v. Schmidt-Tiago Constr. Co., 108 F.R.D. 731, 735 (D. Colo. 1985);
Hodgson v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 54 F.R.D. 445, 446 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Smith v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 689, 691-93 (La. Ct. App. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 430 So.
2d 55 (La. 1983); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. McAlpine, 391 A.2d 84, 90-91 (R.I. 1978).
36 See, e.g., Bondy v. Brophy, 124 F.R.D. 517, 518 (D. Mass. 1989); APL Corp. v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 91 F.R.D. 10, 18 (D. Md. 1980); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Harris, 488 F.
Supp. 1019, 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Ex parte State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 386 So. 2d 1133
(Ala. 1980); Katz v. Allied Van Lines, 431 So. 2d 1099, 1100 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
37 See, e.g., Basinger v. Glacier Carriers, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 771, 774-75 (M.D. Pa. 1985);
McAlpine, 391 A.2d at 90.
38 See, e.g., Sires v. National Sere. Corp., 560 So. 2d 448, 449 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Cabral v.
Arruda, 556 A.2d 47, 49 (R.I. 1989). See generally Annotation, Discovery of Surveillance
Photographs, 19 A.L.R. 4th 1236 (1983) (discussing state and federal cases involving discovery
of moving pictures and videotapes).
39 See, e.g., Koenig v. International Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig. (In re International
Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig.), 693 F.2d 1235, 1238 (5th Cir. 1982) (protecting documents
in accounting firn's special review binders); Derderian v. Polaroid Corp., 121 F.R.D. 13, 18
(D. Mass. 1988) (protecting personal notes kept by employment discrimination plaintiff);
FDIC v. Eagle Properties, 105 F.R.D. 12, 16 (D.D.C. 1984) (protecting communication
between SEC and Office of Comptroller of the Currency that took place during FDIC's
investigation of a bank).
40 See, e.g., Rosado v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 454 N.Y.S.2d 759, 760 (App. Div. 1982)
(protecting defendant's photographs of car); cf. Crull v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 153
N.W.2d 591, 594 (Wis. 1967) (holding that photographs and negatives of accident scene were
work product, but protection overcome because defendant had no opportunity to duplicate).
41 See, e.g., Bohannon v. Honda Motor Co., 127 F.R.D. 536, 541 (D. Kan. 1989)
(protecting artist's rendition of accident scene prior to physical modification of intersection).
42 See, e.g., United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1300 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (allowing intervention to raise work product claim for computerized litigation support
system); In re IBM Peripherals, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 878 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
See generally Barry E. Friedman, Note, Computer Discovery in Federal Litigation: Playing by
the Rules, 69 Geo. L.J. 1465 (1981) (discussing the unique questions computers pose for
pretrial discovery).
43 Commentators, however, have raised the issue of opinion work product and have
expressed concern about the discovery of the authorities supporting a legal position, attorney
opinion regarding the veracity or effectiveness of witnesses, and broad questions about a
party's position on mixed questions of law and fact. See, e.g., Special Project, supra note 16;
Developments, supra note 13.
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statements or meetings,44 attorney opinion regarding the settlement
value of a case or the client's chances of prevailing,45 trial strategy
generally,46 lists of trial witnesses and their expected testimony,47 lists
or copies of trial exhibits,48 deposition preparation,49 attitudinal
surveys done on behalf of a litigant,So and material such as might be
found in a trial notebook.51
As even this summary list reveals, the material protected by the
work product doctrine is likely to be extremely relevant to any law-
suit. Part II of this Article examines whether the suppression of such
crucial information is necessary to the functioning of the adversary
system.
44 See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 401 (1981); Horn & Hardart Co. v.
Pillsbury Co., 888 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1989). Attorneys' notes actually fall in a gray area
between ordinary and opinion work product, depending on whether the notes merely recite
facts or contain the attorney's thought processes. Compare Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508
(attorney notes found to be work product) with Leede Oil & Gas v. McCorkle, 789 S.W.2d 686
(Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (factual portions of attorney's notes not work product).
45 See, e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 159-60 (1975) (protecting
memoranda of NLRB's general counsel containing litigation strategy and settlement advice as
work product and therefore granting memoranda protection under Exemption 5 of FOIA);
Pennsylvania v. HI-S, 623 F. Supp. 301, 306 (M.D. Pa. 1985) (same for documents discussing
settlement proposals and litigation strategies); cf. Vincent v. Lemaire, 370 So. 2d 190, 193 (La.
Ct. App. 1979) (settlement brochure prepared for one lawsuit is work product in later, related
case).
46 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 45; see also James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D.
138, 143-44 (D. Del. 1982) (protecting memoranda of opinions of counsel regarding prospect
of litigation).
47 See, e.g., City of Long Beach v. Superior Ct., 134 Cal. Rptr. 468, 476-78 (Ct. App. 1976)
(protecting list of witnesses to be called at trial and summary of their testimony).
48 See Fleming James, Jr. & Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Civil Procedure § 5.10 (3d ed. 1985)
(unwarranted disclosure of matters marshaled for trial can reveal attorney's intended lines of
proof); see also Cooper, supra note 8, at 1296 ("[lIt is generally accepted that a party may not
seek a statement of the evidence which will be offered at trial to prove each of his opponent's
points .... ").
49 See, e.g., Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312 (3d Cir.) (protecting defense counsel's selection of
documents used to prepare deponent because disclosure would reveal attorney's mental
impressions), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1985).
50 See, e.g., Penk v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 99 F.R.D. 511, 514-15 (D. Or. 1983)
(protecting surveys of class members); Connelly v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 96 F.R.D. 339,
342-43 (D. Mass. 1982) (same); Karan v. Nabisco, Inc., 28 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 794,
796 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (protecting attitudinal survey done in preparing defense to employment
discrimination claim).
51 See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)




From the beginning, the arguments in favor of protecting work
product have been primarily utilitarian, rather than a defense of work
product protection as something inherently good. And like all discov-
ery privileges, the work product doctrine subordinates a policy of lib-
eral discovery to other societal interests. 2 Thus work product
immunity can be justified only to the extent to which it is necessary to
achieve some higher societal goal.
Most of the traditional arguments in favor of work product immu-
nity stem from the Supreme Court's rationale in Hickman. 3 More
recently, the law and economics school has put its own spin on the
work product debate. Both schools of thought tend to make argu-
ments that fall into two categories: work product is necessary to pro-
tect the functioning of the adversary system; or work product is
necessary to protect attorneys.
A. The Traditional Arguments for Work Product Immunity
L Protection of the Adversary System
The dominant argument for work product immunity focuses on the
requirements of the adversary system. The argument thus assumes
that the adversary system is desirable. This is certainly a debatable
conclusion.54 Nonetheless, proponents of the work product doctrine
both assume that an adversarial presentation of facts at trial is good
or necessary and believe that adversarial gathering of facts helps to
52 Charles T. McCormick notes:
[Privileges] do not in any wise aid the ascertainment of truth, but rather they shut out
the light. Their sole warrant is the protection of interests and relationships which,
rightly or wrongly, are regarded as of sufficient social importance to justify some
incidental sacrifice of sources of facts needed in the administration of justice.
Charles T. McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 Tex. L. Rev. 447,
447-48 (1938).
53 See infra Part II.A for a discussion of the arguments stemming from the Court's analysis
in Hickman.
54 The adversary system, although taken as a given by many, is not without its critics. See,
e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, Partisan Justice (1980); David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An
Ethical Study (1988); Edmund Byrne, The Adversary System: Who Needs It?, in Ethics and
the Legal Profession 204 (Michael Davis & Frederick A. Elliston eds., 1986); Marvin E.
Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1031 (1975); John H.
Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823 (1985); Arthur
R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1984); Roscoe
Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 40 Am. L.
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arrive at "truth" in resolving disputes. 55 Operationally, many believe
that the adversary system works only when each of the parties single-
mindedly and thoroughly pursues its own self-interest throughout the
litigation process, culminating in an adversarial presentation of evi-
dence and arguments. Work product immunity, they argue, is neces-
sary to make this happen.56
One problem with this vision of the litigation process is its focus on
the trial. Assuming a full-blown adversarial trial to be the norm, pro-
ponents of work product immunity claim that immunity really con-
ceals nothing because facts are discoverable before trial, and trial
strategy (opinion work product) will be disclosed at the trial itself.
Thus, at least in theory, the trier of fact is deprived of neither fact nor
legal theory in making its decision.57 In modem America, however,
an overwhelming majority of civil cases are resolved prior to trial.5"
Cases settled during discovery risk a lopsided settlement based on
incomplete information because of work product protection.59 Even
assuming that an adversary trial is necessary, arguments in support of
Rev. 729, 738-40 (1906); William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice
and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 29.
Another critical perspective comes from feminists who argue that the traditional adversarial
model is a stereotypically male one, stressing autonomy and competition and eschewing
cooperation and sharing. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice:
Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, I Berkeley Women's L.J. 39 (1985); see also
Patricia A. Cain, Good and Bad Bias: A Comment on Feminist Theory and Judging, 61 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 1945, 1955 (1988) (extending feminist critique to the act of judging).
55 Historically, the belief that an adversarial competition of equally prepared opponents
would best arrive at truth developed some time after the recognition that magic could not
determine victors. "If God does not decide who wins, the system must do so .... In other
words, the adversary system itself is the magic that replaces God's intervention." Sward,
supra note 2, at 329; see also Robert F. Kane, The Work-Product Doctrine-Cornerstone of
the Adversary System, 31 Ins. Couns. J. 130 (1964) (arguing that work product protection is a
necessary element of our adversarial system).
56 See, e.g., Note, supra note 6, at 334-35.
57 In practice, however, some facts are neither discovered before trial nor introduced into
evidence during trial. See infra Part III.A.1 & 2.
58 See Albert W. Alsehuler, Foreword: The Vanishing Civil Jury, 1990 U. Chi. Legal F. I,
2-4.
59 See Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal
Problems and Abuses, 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 789, 811-12 (discussing American Bar
Foundation survey finding that 96% of the attorneys surveyed had settled a case when the
attorney or client" 'still had arguably significant information (including information protected
by privilege) which, to the best of [the attorney's] knowledge, another party had not
discovered,"' particularly in large cases, federal court cases, and cases involving corporate
clients).
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work product immunity also must account for the needs of the discov-
ery, settlement, and alternative dispute resolution processes.
Nevertheless, proponents of work product immunity envision the
trial as the normal end-point of litigation and believe that discovery of
work product would significantly undermine the process of preparing
adequately for the adversarial trial. Work product immunity, its sup-
porters believe, protects the adversary system in five, related ways.
First, it encourages the most complete possible investigation. Second,
it allows the advocate to commit the results of that investigation and
other litigation-related thought processes to writing. Third, it dis-
courages "sharp practices."'  Fourth, it allows surprise as a vehicle
for encouraging truthful testimony. Fifth, it avoids forcing litigants
to freeze their contentions too early in a lawsuit. These assertions,
however, are not supported by empirical data. Rather, when carefully
analyzed, these alleged threats to the adversary system are unlikely to
occur and can be cured in much more limited ways.
a. Work Product Immunity and Adequate Preparation
In Hickman, the majority opinion states only that:
it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free
from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel.
Proper preparation of a client's case demands that he assemble infor-
mation, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant
facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue
and needless interference.61
Although the Supreme Court did not articulate a reason why attor-
neys need privacy for proper preparation, subsequent commentators
have filled in the gap. Disclosure of work product, some say, would
discourage attorneys from using their fullest efforts to develop their
clients' cases.62
60 See infra Part II.A. l(c) for a definition and discussion of "sharp practices."
61 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11. The Hickman Court did not claim that empirical data
supported its fears but "merely assumed that certain undesirable effects would, in fact, occur."
Neal E. Tackabery, Note, Discovery of an Attorney's Work Product on Subsequent Litigation,
1974 Duke L.J. 799, 807.
62 See James A. Gardner, Agency Problems in the Law of Attorney-Client Privilege:
Privilege and "Work Product" Under Open Discovery (Part II), 42 U. Det. L.J. 253, 270
(1965); Wells, supra note 10, at 684; Developments, supra note 13, at 1029.
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This rationale fears two scenarios. First, attorneys may fail to pre-
pare their clients' cases thoroughly, believing that they can instead
merely appropriate their opponents' cases full-blown and avoid doing
any personal preparation (the "lazy lawyer" model). 63 Second, attor-
neys may incompletely prepare their cases for fear of developing
adverse information in the process of investigating and preparing
cases for trial and may terminate avenues of investigation that seem
likely to expose information helpful to the adversary (the "bad facts"
model).6M This rationale is plausible only if we believe that, absent
work product protection, attorneys actually will fail to prepare their
cases adequately. Both the lazy lawyer model and the bad facts
model, however, are unpersuasive.
Obviously work product immunity is not the inducement for attor-
ney preparation. Rather, the adversary system, with its demand for
competition and winning cases, supplies the motivation for prepara-
tion. The work product doctrine, however, is said to be necessary to
keep discovery from discouraging the preparation that ordinarily
would occur. We assume, therefore, that the system already contains
incentives for adequate preparation. The question is whether open
discovery, including discovery of trial preparation materials, would
exert such a strong pull that it would overcome the otherwise power-
ful forces encouraging preparation already existing within the adver-
sary system.
There are a number of forces, within the larger context of the
adversary system, that would compel adequate preparation even if
work product were discoverable. First, attorneys' livelihoods depend
in large part on their reputations for success and integrity, both with
their peers and within the universe of potential clients.65 The lazy
63 See Gardner, supra note 62, at 270; Wells, supra note 10, at 684; see also Ohio R. Civ. P.
26(A) (work product designed to prevent attorneys from taking undue advantage of
adversary's efforts); Kagan v. Langer Transp. Corp., 43 F.R.D. 404, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
("[Rlequiring production of such attorney's work product would . . . destroy counsel's
incentive diligently to prepare for trial ... since otherwise he could, merely by sitting back and
doing nothing, avail himself of the work product and professional diligence of counsel for the
other side.").
64 See Cooper, supra note 8, at 1279; Special Project, supra note 16, at 785; Developments,
supra note 13, at 1029; see also Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2016(g) (West 1983) (observing that
state policy underlying work product doctrine is to encourage attorneys to prepare thoroughly
and to investigate both the favorable and unfavorable aspects of their case); Ohio R. Civ. P.
26(A) (same).
65 Wells, supra note 10, at 687.
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lawyer model of behavior would emerge only if it would lead to
equivalent professional success and esteem. But the notion that a per-
son simply can take her opponent's preparation and effectively try a
case is ludicrous. Although knowledge of an opponent's strategies
may be helpful, it is no substitute for independent development of a
theory of the case, investigation of relevant facts, and structuring of
proof. An attorney who has prepared her own case thoroughly will,
over time, be more successful than one who has merely appropriated
an opponent's work product.66 In addition, it seems likely that an
attorney who habitually uses and is known to use derivative work
product risks being held in low esteem by her peers.67
The bad facts model of attorney behavior also is unlikely to emerge.
Work product immunity does not protect the litigant from supplying
her adversary with the underlying or harmful facts. Therefore, if a
litigant uncovers harmful information in preparing a case for trial,
and her opponent successfully asks for that information by interro-
gatory or by deposition question, the information must be disclosed.68
Thus work product immunity cannot provide an incentive for the liti-
gant to go forward with a totally thorough investigation into both
helpful and harmful facts any more than the adversary system itself
can encourage such investigation.
Also, the discoverability of work product will deter adequate prepa-
ration only if the preparer is certain that the immunity would have
applied. But because the work product doctrine is an unpredictable
one, involving balancing tests and susceptibility to overrides based on
subsequent events, an attorney simply cannot be certain when work
product is generated that it will be protected from discovery-even
with the existence of work product immunity.69 Work has to be done
with the knowledge that under some circumstances the information
will be discoverable. If work product immunity has any effect on trial
66 Waits, supra note 9, at 331.
67 See id. at 329.
68 Often, of course, the adversary may not be able to ask the magic question that unlocks the
harmful information. In that case, the work product doctrine may operate to conceal from the
trier of fact important information that may even skew the results of the trial. See infra Part
III.A.1. Not even the proponents of work product immunity, however, openly advocate its use
to prevent discovery of relevant facts.
69 Cf. Tackabery, supra note 61, at 810 (arguing that harmful consequences of work product
discovery occur because of what the lawyer anticipates at the time of preparation rather than
from the discovery itself).
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preparation, the effect stems from the attorney's belief about discover-
ability and confidence that information will be protected, and it is
those feelings that will control her actions and encourage her to pre-
pare, rather than a court's later decision about the protection afforded
a particular piece of work product. Therefore, it seems even less
likely that changing the rule to make work product discoverable
would have a significant effect on a litigant's actions in preparing for
trial.70
Some have argued that the discoverability of work product actually
would produce better preparation. If trial preparation were freely dis-
coverable by both sides, attorneys would not be able to rely on their
opponents' ignorance of gaps in preparation. If defects persist, the
opponent will be able to take advantage of the defects. Both sides
therefore must prepare thoroughly, knowing that the opponent can
discover their omissions.71
Other pressures within the legal system also encourage thorough
preparation. Assuming that an attorney who relies on borrowed or
incomplete preparation will be less successful over time, client pres-
sure will force thorough preparation. Although one-time litigants
may not be able to determine the parameters of thorough preparation,
it seems likely that sophisticated litigants will insist on complete prep-
aration and will abandon counsel who lose cases from inadequate
effort.72 At the same time, law firm financial pressures encourage
thorough preparation, at least in firms that bill their clients by the
hour.73 Within the limits of client tolerance, law firms will engage in
70 See Mitchell, supra note 15, at 438-39.
71 Cooper, supra note 8, at 1280-81; LaFrance, supra note 5, at 368.
72 The ability of the sophisticated client to require thorough preparation is a significant
factor to consider because a sophisticated litigant who provides repeat business and can
evaluate its attorneys' efforts is most likely to create work product. See infra Part III.B.1 & 2
for further discussion of this point.
73 The discovery process has provided a financial bonanza for many large firms:
Litigation may have fueled the extraordinary growth of firms in the 1960s and 1970s.
It was the ideal producer of the cash flow needed to support one- or two-hundred-
person law firms. Enormous demands for billable hours were generated by enormous
documentary discovery and depositions. Preparation for discovery, review and analysis
of what it produced, and endless motion practice could be easily divided perfectly
among squadrons of young lawyers and used to indoctrinate them into the ways of the
firm. Each operation was comparatively insignificant, yet each demanded considerable
skill and intellectual acuity. There were equally large overhead demands for secretarial
assistance, duplicating, and computerized facilities. These requirements matched the
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thorough discovery in their own economic interest. Furthermore,
attorneys have an independent ethical obligation to adequately repre-
sent their clients based on the Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.74
In short, the pressures of the adversary system compel thorough
preparation. Even if work product were discoverable, litigants and
their attorneys still would investigate the facts of their cases because
there is no clear line between learning helpful facts and harmful facts.
Some litigants, such as insurance companies, are in the business of
investigating claims and do so whether or not litigation is imminent.
These litigants certainly would investigate even without work product
protection. Other litigants still would take witness statements, hire
expert witnesses, do legal research, formulate trial strategy, prepare
witnesses for trial, and plan voir dire, direct examination, cross exam-
ination, and opening and closing statements. They would do these
things because they cannot omit these activities and have any hope of
winning a lawsuit. Although they would prefer to carry on these
activities in secret, they would not stop if the secrecy is removed
because there simply are too many forces that require such activities.
b. Work Product Immunity and Adequate Writing
In Hickman, the Supreme Court was concerned that if work prod-
uct were discoverable "on mere demand, much of what is now put
down in writing would remain unwritten." 75 The fear was that even if
attorneys still did an adequate amount of preparation, they would not
adequately document that preparation: interviews would remain
untranscribed, facts would remain unrecorded, legal research would
not be reduced to writing, and trial plans would remain an idea in the
economic imperatives of the mega-law firm-large cash flow, high capital investment,
and, especially, high ratios of associates to partners.
Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 Stan. L.
Rev. 277, 296 (1985).
74 See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 6-101(A)(2) (1980) ("A lawyer shall
not... [h]andle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances."); Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.1 (1983) (requiring lawyer to provide competent
representation). One commentator has noted that "[t]o place so much emphasis on the efficacy
of the work product immunity in encouraging adequate preparation is very close to arguing
that the professionalism demanded by the Code of Professional Responsibility is observed only
so long as the work product immunity forces lawyers to do their own work." Wells, supra
note 10, at 688.
75 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
1530 [Vol. 77:1515
Rethinking Work Product
mind of the litigator. Writing things down, however, already is
encouraged by powerful forces in the litigation process. Thus the
problem again is whether an opponent's ability to discover work prod-
uct would be a strong enough force to counteract the natural ten-
dency to commit things to writing. An analysis of the realities of
modem litigation shows that the forces impelling attorneys to write
things down are much stronger than any deterrent effect of
discovery.76
Attorneys memorialize information and mental impressions for a
number of reasons. First, attorneys record some information so that
if a witness later changes his testimony, the witness' prior statement
can be used to impeach. Witness statements are crucial to case prepa-
ration because they bind witnesses to a particular version of the
facts.7 7 Attorneys will record even a bad statement for damage con-
trol. Statements containing both helpful and unhelpful information
also will be recorded in their entirety because omission of any unfa-
vorable aspects destroys the usefulness of statements for impeachment
pu7poses.8 Moreover, at early stages of investigation, it will not
always be entirely clear which information is helpful and which is not,
so censorship on such grounds seems unlikely.79 Second, attorneys
record information because they simply cannot remember all of the
important facts and legal points about all of their cases. A busy litiga-
tor cannot try cases without committing to writing at least an outline
of voir dire plans, opening statement, and witness questions. Third,
attorneys record information because the nature of modern law prac-
tice means that the person taking a statement, doing legal research, or
strategizing for trial often is only one among many and may not be
the person who calls the shots or who will try the case. Important
information and strategy must be recorded in order to survive person-
nel changes and hierarchical decisionmaking structures.8 0 Fourth,
some of this writing also will be protected by the attorney-client privi-
76 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges,
and the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 309, 362 ("It is unlikely that Upjohn's
general counsel would have abandoned note-taking in the future if Upjohn had lost its case.").
77 Fleming James, Jr., Civil Procedure § 6.9, at 206 (1965); Cooper, supra note 8, at 1277-
78; LaFrance, supra note 5, at 367; Waits, supra note 9, at 333; Wells, supra note 10, at 690.
78 James, supra note 77, § 6.9, at 206; Tackabery, supra note 61, at 808; Wells, supra note
10, at 690.




lege and needs no additional blanket of work product immunity to
prevent discovery.
c. Work Product Immunity and Sharp Practices
The Supreme Court in Hickman also predicted that if work prod-
uct were discoverable "sharp practices would inevitably develop in
the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial."'"
The Court did not describe the behavior it feared, but commentators
have suggested some possibilities. Attorneys may remove unfavorable
material from their files and fail to produce the documents."2 Alter-
natively, attorneys may stuff their files with irrelevant or misleading
documents, hoping that their adversaries will be unable to find the
truly useful information or will rely on misinformation.8 3
Few commentators have taken the sharp practices claim seri-
ously. 4 Although there may be some reason to fear that attorneys
will lie or will evade requests in order to avoid discovery of work
product, this is true of all discovery.85 Attorneys already must pro-
duce for opponents reams of material, some of which is helpful to the
opponent and much of which is expensive to compile. 6 And discov-
ery of work product would not create the first incentive to engage in
deceptive practices-certainly clients have always resisted turning
over valuable information to litigation opponents.
Are attorneys more likely to lie with respect to work product than
with respect to other discovery? To answer this question, we need to
examine the forces that might lead an attorney to adopt sharp prac-
tices solely with regard to work product. We are dealing with three
types of hypothetical misbehavior: failing to produce relevant infor-
mation, producing large quantities of unnecessary data in order to
81 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
82 Gardner, supra note 62, at 269; Mitchell, supra note 15, at 426.
83 Mitchell, supra note 15, at 426; see also Edward W. Cleary, Hickman v. Jencks:
Jurisprudence of the Adversary System, 14 Vand. L. Rev. 865, 869 (1961) (stating that "false
statements or misleading briefs or memoranda might be inserted in the file [to mislead] the
opposition"); Cooper, supra note 8, at 1276 (also noting the use of misleading and false
documents).
84 See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 8, at 1276; Developments, supra note 13, at 1028.
85 Special Project, supra note 16, at 787.
86 Attorneys produce enormous amounts of material as they are required to disclose
relevant facts and law. Unlike lawyers, whose work product is protected, clients must
cooperate with "all manner of intrusions by the opposing side." Wells, supra note 10, at 692.
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hide important information, and producing false information in order
to mislead an opponent.8 7 Both of the latter two practices are as
tempting with the work product immunity as without it. Counsel and
client who so desire can either "overproduce" or include red herring
documents. Attorneys can mislead opponents through conversation,
pleadings, or manufactured documents. The current rules do not
deter a party from producing more than is required, so a party wish-
ing to deluge or to mislead an opponent can do so under the current
rules.89 The need to disclose work product would not appear to
increase the incentive to overproduce or to mislead, unless it is easier
for an attorney to manufacture misleading work product than to man-
ufacture misleading client documents.
The temptation to fail to produce discoverable work product may
be stronger.90 Even though the temptation already exists with regard
to any harmful information, and clients are not happy with producing
harmful information for the opponent, it is conceivable that clients
may be even more unhappy with producing harmful information that
was created by their attorney and paid for by the client. Whether this
incremental increase in disinclination to produce unfavorable infor-
mation is a significant one is ultimately an empirical question that
cannot be answered under the present system. There is nothing
unique, however, about work product unless two things are true:
(1) attorneys are less honest with regard to discovery of their own
work product than with regard to other discoverable information; and
(2) attorneys as a group are less honest than their clients. 91 In the
absence of these two conditions, nothing justifies a rule stifling the
information flow in order to prevent attorneys from being dishonest-
even if attorneys are, in fact, less enthusiastic about turning over their
work product.
Moreover, there are some institutional forces that counteract
whatever increased tendency toward dishonesty a rule allowing dis-
87 Id.
88 For example, a litigant may plead claims or defenses that she does not intend to pursue
(within the limits of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11), or, in a jurisdiction that allows liberal amendments to
pleadings, may defer pleading a claim or defense until the last moment in order to cut down on
an opponent's preparation time.
89 See Brazil, supra note 59, at 854 ("'Discovery is trial by avalanche of documents.... I
bombard opponents with mounds of information and see if they will wade through it.' ").




covery of work product would create. One is the availability of dis-
covery sanctions.92 Another is the possibility of disciplinary action if
the attorney violates the professional codes.9 3 If these sanctions work
to compel attorneys to produce non-work product, they should com-
pel attorneys to produce work product.
Even assuming some attorneys will be dishonest and withhold work
product, the total information available to the trier of fact still will be
greater without work product immunity. Work product immunity
guarantees a denial of information in order to prevent speculative
behavior; we allow all work product to be hidden because some peo-
ple might wrongfully refuse to produce it. I suspect that most liti-
gants would prefer to risk the sharp practices and gain at least a
possibility of acquiring the information.
Finally, the sharp practices argument somewhat assumes that
attorneys have privacy interests more important than those of their
clients. The attorney claims, however, are legitimate only to the
extent that they further the needs of the client and the judicial system.
"A plumber may also have a desire to have some of his work done in
private, without a fear that others may discover the fruits of his
efforts. However, the interest of the homeowner in unclogged drains
is not sufficiently powerful to create a plumbing 'work product.' "94
A rule that protects attorney lying and evasion at the expense of the
search for truth is a rule that protects plumbers, and dishonest ones at
that.
d. Work Product Immunity and Surprise
In Hickman, neither the majority opinion nor Justice Robert Jack-
son's concurring opinion argues that the work product doctrine is
necessary to preserve a litigant's opportunity to surprise witnesses or
opponents. On the contrary, the majority notes that "[m]utual
knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential
to proper litigation. . . . The deposition-discovery procedure . . .
reduc[es] the possibility of surprise." 95 Some commentators, how-
ever, see the preservation of surprise as essential to the proper func-
92 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37.
93 See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.4 (1983) (prohibiting unfair conduct
toward opposing counsel and party).
94 John W. Gergacz, Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege 7-11 (2d ed. 1990).
95 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507.
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tioning of the adversary system, and work product immunity as
essential to surprise. 9 6 In considering the surprise factor, it is impor-
tant to distinguish between ordinary work product, such as witness
statements, and opinion work product, such as trial strategy.
In advocating surprise in connection with ordinary work product,
commentators generally envision the use of prior statements or other
impeaching information to force a witness to testify truthfully:
[S]ecrecy permits surprise, and surprise is a potent weapon for sepa-
rating truth from falsehood. The honest person, so the reasoning
runs, has no fear of surprise, since he knows the truth. The dishonest
may be discredited by sudden and unexpected confrontation. If, how-
ever, the dishonest witness knows the truth in advance, he will lie.
Thus, full discovery, by dispelling secrecy, serves only to insulate dis-
honesty from exposure. 9 7
This belief, however, overlooks several important points. First, sur-
prise confrontation may discredit the truthful as well as the untruth-
ful witness. Witnesses' memories are rarely perfect, and surprising a
witness with a small discrepancy from an earlier statement may make
even a truthful witness appear to be untruthful.98 Second, under the
current Federal Rules the witness herself is entitled to a copy of her
statement,99 so that a witness who wishes to shape dishonest testi-
mony in a way that matches or explains an earlier statement already
can do so simply by requesting a copy of that statement. This rule
also means that litigants have access to their own statements and to
the statements of friendly witnesses who will cooperate. Litigants are
denied access, however, to those statements most likely to be help-
ful-prior statements of the opponent and unfriendly witnesses.
Third, there are techniques other than surprise for ensuring witness
truthfulness. The most important is cross-examination, which gener-
96 See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 8, at 1275 ("[T]he adversary system of litigation cannot
function in an atmosphere of complete candor.... ."); see also Kane, supra note 55, at 130-31
(explaining how work product immunity is essential to the preservation of the adversary
system).
97 LaFrance, supra note 5, at 369.
98 Or, the earlier statement may have been transcribed inaccurately, making the witness
who was unfairly surprised by the statement look dishonest on the witness stand. Id.; Wells,
supra note 10, at 701-02.
99 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
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ally does not rely on surprise for success."oo Rather, cross-examina-
tion works because the attorney leads the witness down a path of true
answers that, in turn, require the answer the questioner desires. 10 1 A
witness' knowledge of his or her own prior statements and other rele-
vant facts will not impede this process.
The discovery of opinion work product would undermine a differ-
ent kind of surprise, according to some commentators. The fear is
that it would warp the adversary presentation of evidence necessary to
truth-seeking. 102 This argument overlooks two realities of modern lit-
igation. First, a truly effective strategy, one that relies on credible
evidence and arguments about reasonable inferences to be drawn from
that evidence, would not lose its force because an opponent knew
about it ahead of time. Moreover, discovery also would mean that an
attorney would learn the strategy of her opponent. 10 3 If there are
weaknesses in the strategy that the opponent can discern, the truth-
seeking process is not served by allowing the weak strategy to escape
rebuttal because it comes as a surprise."° Second, much trial strategy
already is disclosed to the adversary as part of the pretrial process.
Increasingly, federal and state judges order parties to summarize their
factual and legal contentions, agree to undisputed facts, list witnesses
and summarize their testimony, and list exhibits-all as part of a pre-
trial conference procedure. 10 5 New procedures such as summary jury
trials also encourage the early revelation of traditional work prod-
uct.10 6 These developments change the issue from one of surprise to
one of timing and degree of detail of disclosure."1 7 These issues can be
100 See Wells, supra note 10, at 702. See generally Kenney F. Hegland, Trial and Practice
Skills in a Nutshell 50-82 (1978) (explaining various methods of cross-examination, none of
which requires surprise as an element).
101 See Wells, supra note 10, at 702.
102 See Cooper, supra note 8, at 1275.
103 See LaFrance, supra note 5, at 360-61 ("Both sides have a reciprocal right to the other's
trial preparations. Thus the only item lost through discovery is the benefit of surprise. But
while surprise may cause one side to emerge victorious, it hardly seems essential or valuable in
a system which seeks, not victors, but the truth.") (footnote omitted).
104 See id. at 368.
105 See infra notes 279-84 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 16; Tex. R. Civ.
P. Ann. r. 166 (West Supp. 1991). See generally J. Skelly Wright, The Pretrial Conference, 28
F.R.D. "141 (1960) (explaining pretrial procedures of a routine case).
106 See Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 1988).
107 As one commentator argues:
it would be surprising in the extreme if a party were ordered to prepare a verbatim"
statement of the questions to be put to each witness and the anticipated replies, or to
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addressed with specific rules-they do not, however, justify the cur-
rent expansive ban on the discovery of work product.
e. Work Product Immunity and Issue Freezing
"Some commentators view Hickman and the work product immu-
nity as a way to avoid issue freezing .... ,"108 Arguably, discovery of
work product might lock an attorney into a particular position with
regard to the facts or law of the case. The concern is that once a legal
theory has been discovered, the attorney might be reluctant to modify
or retreat from it for fear of appearing uncertain or bringing about
impeachment with the earlier answers. 10 9
It seems unlikely, however, that the disclosure of work product
really would cause much harmful issue freezing. Attorneys, faced
with such discovery requests, would "almost certainly err on the side
of caution by disclosing even the most remotely applicable theo-
ries.""' And the bench and bar would recognize the need for a liti-
gant to change her position as discovery progressed and would most
likely liberally allow amendments to pleadings and discovery
responses until a reasonable time before trial. 1
As long as flexibility is built into the system, the discovery of pure
legal theories and of contentions mingling fact and law can serve to
narrow the issues in the lawsuit and to shape the controversy between
the parties.
[T]he fact that discovery of legal theories may often accomplish noth-
ing does not justify its prohibition. The possibly small measure of
accomplishment must be weighed against the ordinarily slight burden
imposed.... As long as a great deal of flexibility is allowed in deviat-
divulge cross-examination plans. Likewise, it would be clearly improper to order
disclosure of the arguments to be used to persuade the factfinder to draw particular
conclusions of fact from the evidence at trial.
Cooper, supra note 8, at 1296.
108 Wells, supra note 10, at 697.
109 Gardner, supra note 62, at 272 n.301; Wells, supra note 10, at 697-98; see also James &
Hazard, supra note 48, § 5.12, at 258 (explaining undesirability of tying attorneys down to
particular theories at an early stage).
110 Wells, supra note 10, at 699; see also Cooper, supra note 8, at 1291 (explaining increased
preparation by attorneys to meet anticipated issues); Warren H. Smith, Comment, The
Potential for Discovery of Opinion Work Product Under Rule 26(b)(3), 64 Iowa L. Rev. 103,
116 (1978) (noting that even "conscientious" attorneys will need to change their positions as
facts develop and should not be bound by initial statements).
I11 See sources cited supra note 110.
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ing from the issues developed in discovery-and probably the only
appropriate limitation is one of willful bad faith-the benefits of
obtaining a preliminary, even though tentative, specification of issues
weigh in favor of allowing discovery.112
Thus the concern about issue freezing reveals itself to be primarily
a timing issue. The feared vice is not that issues will be frozen, but
that they will be frozen too soon, deterring parties from adapting their
legal theories to fit their evolving understanding of the underlying
facts. These timing issues can be resolved with a timing rule, one that
allows responses to be modified and allows trial courts discretion to
postpone the need to answer certain discovery requests until a later
stage of the proceedings. 113 Timing issues alone cannot justify a total
prohibition of discovery of work product.
2. Protection of Attorneys
The arguments discussed above claim that work product immunity
ensures the proper functioning of the adversary system. A second
group of arguments claims that work product immunity is necessary
to protect attorneys.I 4 This group of arguments divides into three
kinds of claims: first, work product immunity is necessary to protect
attorney reputation or the "tone" of the legal profession; second,
work product immunity is necessary to avoid attorneys testifying dur-
ing discovery or trial; and third, attorneys have a proprietary interest
in their work that is infringed by discovery of work product. For
some, all of these arguments are categorically unpersuasive because
they put the selfish interests of attorneys above the truth-seeking func-
tion of the adversary system.1 5 In addition, each is inherently flawed.
112 Cooper, supra note 8, at 1293.
113 See id. at 1290; see also infra text accompanying notes 279-87 for a discussion of rules
addressing timing concerns.
14 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 515 (Jackson, J., concurring).
15 Arguably, anytime such a claim is made by a attorney it should be viewed with
suspicion:
The extent to which the profession's personal or economic interests have influenced
the scope of confidentiality rules can never be known. Yet their mere existence leads
one to wonder whether the attorney-drafters of the strict codes-perhaps even
unintentionally-have overemphasized the systemic justifications for confidentiality or
undervalued the social benefits of less restrictive rules.
Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 351, 361 (1989) (footnote
omitted) (discussing attorney-client privilege); see supra Part II.A. 1 for arguments tying attor-
ney self-interests to the adversary system's search for truth.
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a Work Product Immunity and the Legal Profession
The majority opinion in Hickman spoke of work product disclosure
having a "demoralizing" effect on the legal profession.116 Similarly,
Justice Jackson's concurring opinion expressed great concern for the
"welfare and tone of the legal profession."'1 17 Unspoken, but underly-
ing both opinions, is a suggestion that the discoverability of work
product might have unfortunate consequences for the legal profession
because it would damage the legal profession's reputation with
outsiders.
Perhaps in 1947 the legal profession was held in high public
esteem.118 Today, with public opinion of attorneys very low and
attorney jokes rampant, 119 the legal profession's reputation is not
likely to be significantly damaged by making work product discovera-
ble. Moreover, even if at the time of Hickman the legal profession
conformed to the model of the "gentleman's club," in which certain
behavior (such as prying into the private thoughts of another member
of the bar) simply was not done, 120 that "tone" of the profession
116 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
117 Id. at 515 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson seemed concerned primarily with
the problem of the attorney forced to become an impeaching witness, discussed below. His
comments about "tone and morale," however, have caused some courts to focus on these
concerns. See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 487 F.2d 480, 483
(4th Cir. 1973) ("Hickman's overriding concern is that the lawyer's morale be protected as he
performs his professional functions .... ."); In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1078 (4th Cir. 1981)
(quoting Duplan for its concern with attorney morale).
118 Glenna Whitley, Why We Love to Hate Lawyers, D Magazine, May 1991, at 47, 48
(suggesting that in the past "our natural abhorrence of attorneys was tempered somewhat by
those images of lawyers who stood for noble, high-minded causes").
119 A few examples:
(1) Q: "How do you know when a lawyer is lying?"
A: "His lips are moving."
(2) Q: "What do you call a busload of lawyers at the bottom of the ocean?"
A: "A good start."
(3) Q: "What's the difference between a dead skunk on the road and a dead lawyer on
the road?"
A: "There are skid marks in front of the skunk."
(4) "A lawyer was informed by St. Peter that it was time for him to die. 'But St. Peter,'
said the lawyer, 'I'm only 38 years old!' 'That's strange,' replied St. Peter,
'according to your time sheets you're 72.'"
120 Wells, supra note 10, at 695.
already has disappeared.121 Today, "Rambo" tactics affect litigators'
lives daily. 12  Finally, even if discovery of work product would harm
attorney reputation, the needs of the legal system are more important.
The self-perceived needs of the legal profession cannot survive when
they are detrimental to society as a whole. 123 The "unseemliness"
argument is mere rhetoric and should be ignored. 124
b. Work Product Immunity and Attorney Witnesses
In Hickman, Justice Jackson expressed great concern that the dis-
closure of work product would force the attorney to become a wit-
ness."2 5 More specifically, Justice Jackson feared this scenario:
(1) the attorney interviews a witness and reduces his recollection of
the witness' statement to writing; (2) the attorney is forced to supply
opposing counsel with a copy of his interview notes during discovery;
(3) at trial, the witness testifies in a way that differs from the attorney
notes; (4) the witness is impeached with the attorney's version of the
witness' statement; and so (5) the attorney may need to testify, either
to restore his own credibility (disagree with the witness' version and
impeach the witness) or to rehabilitate the witness (explain how both
versions are really consistent, or how inaccuracies crept into his writ-
ten account). 126
Although this scenario is undesirable, it is a problem more imagi-
nary than real. First, the chance of the situation arising can be
decreased dramatically by having non-attorneys, or attorneys who
will not act as trial counsel, interview the witness and record the
notes. Alternatively, the attorney can tape-record conversations with
121 See Robert K. Wise, The Lawyer-Witness Rule: A Comparison of a Lawyer's Ability to
be Both a Witness and an Advocate Under the Texas Code of Professional Responsibility and
the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, 31 S. Tex. L. Rev. 651, 660 n.27 (1990).
122 See Stephanie B. Goldberg, Playing Hardball, A.B.A. J., July 1, 1987, at 48 (defining
and discussing "hardball" litigation tactics); Robert P. Lawry, The Central Moral Tradition of
Lawyering, 19 Hofstra L. Rev. 311 (1990) (discussing the ethical challenges in being a lawyer);
Gary Taylor, Texas Sets Its Sights on "Rambo," Nat'l L.J., July 31, 1989, at 3 (discussing the
problem of overly aggressive litigators in Texas).
123 A good example of this phenomenon is found in the now-defunct ban on attorney
advertising. See Wells, supra note 10, at 695-96; see also Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350
(1977) (striking down an attorney advertising ban); ABA Canons of Professional Ethics Canon
27 (1936) (banning attorney advertising).
124 Cooper, supra note 8, at 1275; Wells, supra note 10, at 696.
125 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 517 (Jackson, J., concurring).
126 See id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
1540 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 77:1515
Rethinking Work Product
witnesses. 12 7 A third possibility is to depose important witnesses.
Any of these approaches will keep the attorney off the stand if
impeachment becomes necessary.
More important than these devices, adequate trial preparation
should remove the risk of a witness testifying differently from his pre-
vious statement. Justice Jackson's scenario imagines the situation in
which an attorney interviews a friendly witness, turns his attorney
notes over to opposing counsel, and then puts the witness on the stand
and is surprised by different testimony. In preparing that friendly
witness for deposition or trial, however, the attorney who took the
notes still has those notes and, furthermore, knows that the opponent
has the notes. The attorney can go over his notes with the witness,
and the witness will be familiar with its contents. It seems extremely
unlikely that in this situation the witness will testify in a way that
differs from the attorney's version of the witness' statement. If the
witness does testify differently, but, upon being shown the attorney
notes, agrees that the original statement is correct, there still is no
need for the attorney to testify. It is only if the witness persists in
testifying differently from the statement recorded in the attorney's
notes that the attorney might need to testify.
If the witness whose statement was taken by the attorney is a hos-
tile witness, opposing counsel most likely will prepare the witness to
testify. Again, that attorney will have a copy of the statement as will
the attorney who took the statement originally, so it remains unlikely
that the witness' testimony will deviate from the statement. If the
testimony becomes more favorable to the attorney who took the state-
ment, that attorney will have no desire to impeach the witness.
Opposing counsel may impeach, but she probably will do so using the
statement, not by calling as a witness the attorney who took the state-
ment. If the testimony becomes less favorable to the attorney who
took the statement, the attorney who took the statement can impeach
the witness with the statement without taking the witness stand. It is
in this situation, further, that it is best to have either a deposition, a
tape-recorded statement, or a statement taken by another attorney or
investigator in the event the discrepancy is important enough to war-
127 This option may not have been feasible in 1947, but with easy access today to small but
technologically advanced recording devices, it is an option that must be recognized.
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rant impeaching. Proper advance planning can eliminate almost
entirely the attorney testimony problem.
In addition, it must be noted that the legal community is not as
worried about attorney witnesses as it once was. Originally, the rule
against attorney testimony was an evidentiary matter. Because a
party could not testify on his own behalf, the party's agent, the attor-
ney, could not do so either.128 Many modern courts and evidentiary
codes reject the idea that a party or an attorney is not a competent
witness.129 Instead, an attorney's ability to serve as a witness is ana-
lyzed in light of professional ethics. As an ethical issue, the attorney
witness prohibitions derive from the interests of the client, the inter-
ests of the opposing party,130 and the interests of the public.131
Today, a modern evaluation of these concerns has led to an attorney
witness rule that permits attorney testimony more frequently than
before. 132
128 See 6 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trial At Common Law § 1911, at 774 (James H.
Chadbourne rev. ed. 1976) (as early as 1846, attorney disqualified because he was too closely
identified with his client); American Bar Association/The Bureau of National Affairs,
Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct § 61:503 (1984) [hereinafter Manual on Conduct]
("The rule originated in the law of evidence as a corollary to the general principle that neither
a party nor one aligned in interest with a party is competent as a witness on the party's
behalf."); see also Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 676 (7th Cir. 1985)
(attorney cannot be both witness and counsel unless attorney withdraws as counsel before
testifying), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1129 (1986).
129 See, e.g., Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. American Gym, Recreational & Athletic Equip.
Corp., 546 F.2d 530, 539 (3d Cir. 1976) (stating that it is well-settled that a lawyer is
competent to testify on behalf of his client).
130 In more genteel times, concern for the opponent centered on the gentleman attorney's
reluctance to cross-examine opposing counsel, preferring to defer to one another as a matter of
professional courtesy. Wise, supra note 121, at 660 n.27. But see supra Part II.A.2(a),
discussing the demise of the "gentlemen's era" and the change in the "tone" of the legal
profession.
131 See Wise, supra note 121, at 659-61.
132 Contrast, for example, DR 5-102 and DR 5-101 of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility with Rule 3.7 of the more recently created Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. The Model Code allowed attorney testimony on contested issues only if refusal
"would work a substantial hardship on the client because of the distinctive value of the lawyer
or his firm as counsel in the particular case." Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR
5-101(3)(4) (1981). The newer Model Rule deletes the "distinctive value" requirement and
invokes a balancing test between the interests of the client and the interests of the opposing
party, resulting in fewer disqualifications. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
3.7(a)(3) & cmt. (1983).
Further, the new Model Rule allows one attorney in a firm to act as advocate and another
attorney in the same firm to be a witness in the same case unless doing so creates a substantial
conflict of interest between attorney and client. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
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Under modern codes of ethics, therefore, an attorney may some-
times both serve as advocate and testify to impeach a witness without
violating any ethical rules. If the attorney's testimony would be help-
ful to the client, it will be subjected to a balancing test to determine
whether the attorney should be disqualified. 133 If on balance the prej-
udice from disqualification would outweigh the prejudice to the oppo-
nent, representation and testimony will be allowed. 134  If the
attorney's testimony would be harmful to the client, the extent of the
conflict becomes the key issue. The attorney may be allowed to tes-
tify, and the client can waive the conflict. 35 In some jurisdictions, the
disqualification is personal to the attorney witness, and other attor-
neys in the firm may continue to represent the client. All of this goes
on even with the existence of the work product immunity. Thus the
discoverability of work product may create new instances in which
attorney testimony would be desired, but it will not create a new phe-
nomenon-attorneys already can testify.
Because attorneys do have the right to testify under certain circum-
stances, the current work product rule produces uneven results. If
discrepancies exist between witness statements and trial testimony,
they will be brought to light only occasionally. If the statement rather
than the trial testimony favors the attorney who took the statement,
the attorney, having a copy of the statement, may use it to impeach
the witness. 136 If the testimony rather than the earlier statement
favors the attorney who took the statement, it never will be men-
tioned. Opposing counsel, deprived of the statement by the work
3.7(b) cmt. (1983). Some jurisdictions go even further, permitting the disqualified attorney to
participate in pretrial preparation of the case so long as the attorney witness does not take an
active role at trial. See Tex. Sup. Ct. St. B.R. 3.08(c) & cmt. 8. The attorney witness thus can
engage in activities such as drafting pleadings, motions, and briefs, formulating strategy, and
preparing written discovery.
133 See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.7 cmt. 4 (1983); see also Keosian v.
Von Kaulback, 707 F. Supp. 150, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (discussing standard used to disqualify
an attorney charged with conflict of interest); Wise, supra note 121, at 670 (similar discussion).
134 See Manual on Conduct, supra note 128, § 51:103-04.
135 See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 1.7 & 1.9 (1983).
136 This kind of impeachment of a witness called by a party may have been impermissible at
the time Hickman was decided. Under the then-existing doctrine of "vouching," a party
generally was prohibited from impeaching its own witnesses unless it could show that the
testimony was a surprise. This scenario, therefore, is probably not the one contemplated by
Justice Jackson. Today, however, in most jurisdictions a witness may be impeached by any




product doctrine, will not have the statement and will not be able to
impeach the witness with its contents. The current rule therefore
makes it more likely that self-serving, improved witness testimony
will be offered without any controls whatsoever.
c. Work Product Immunity and Proprietary Interest
In Hickman, the Supreme Court expressed concern that an attor-
ney's thoughts "would not be his own" if discovery of work product
were allowed. 137 This argument views work product materials as the
attorney's property. This property notion depends on two questiona-
ble assumptions. First, it assumes that work product information
originates with the attorney whose work product will be discovered.
This is unlikely, however. Facts are much more likely to originate
with the client, nonparty witnesses, and various tangible evidence
than with the attorney. The application of legal theories to these
facts, although more likely to come from the attorney, often stems
from publicly available statutes and case law. In addition, legal theo-
ries generally are not protected by existing work product doctrine.
Second, the property notion assumes that the attorney has an eco-
nomic interest in the work product. This assumption confficts with
the adversary system's goal of the disclosure of truth. As Professor
Edward H. Cooper notes:
Clearly no one would argue today that a court should be forced to
determine a lawsuit on the basis of inadequate information in order to
preserve for one party the advantages gained by luck, skill, or wealth.
Discovery itself rests on an impatient rejection of any assertion of a
proprietary privilege to prevail because of unilateral ignorance. 138
The attorney's argument that she has an economic interest in the
information must be rejected.
In addition, the attorney has been paid for producing this work
product. The attorney is free to negotiate whatever fee arrangements
the market will bear and is paid accordingly for the work. No extra
compensation is due because the work is shared with someone else.
Although clients may have some interest in reimbursement for their
137 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
138 Cooper, supra note 8, at 1274.
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payment for the work product,13 9 the attorney has negotiated a fee
arrangement that provided sufficient incentive for the work to be done
and has received that fee. The attorney is due no additional
compensation. 140
B. The Law and Economics Argument for Work Product
Immunity
Two recent articles have analyzed the work product doctrine from
the perspective of law and economics. 41 Both articles treat work
product immunity as a kind of property right belonging to the attor-
ney, and both assume that work product immunity causes more prep-
aration to be done. One article finds this to be unfortunate, whereas
the other finds it to be desirable. Both articles, when closely analyzed,
depend on the unverified assumptions about adequate trial prepara-
tion discussed above.
The first article, written by Judge Frank Easterbrook, analyzes evi-
dentiary privileges as intellectual property rights and finds an inherent
tension:142 a rule allowing information to be used freely, once in exist-
ence, may maximize the wealth of both the users and society. Such a
rule, however, would reduce the ability of those who create informa-
tion to benefit from it. Easterbrook argues that people would there-
fore "create less information and take costly precautions to keep
secret what they do create." 1 43 This, then, is a law and economics
version of the "adequate preparation" model discussed above, which
argues that work product protection is necessary to prevent open dis-
covery from discouraging attorney preparation. 144
139 See, e.g., Ill. S. Ct. R. 201(b) (allowing cost-shifting); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C)
(allowing fee-shifting for discovery done by expert witnesses).
140 For additional authorities questioning the proprietary interest claim, see Dale G. Wills,
Note, Waiver of the Work Product Immunity, 1981 U. Ill. L. Rev. 953, 961; Smith, supra note
110, at 115.
141 Easterbrook, supra note 76; Positive Theory, supra note 11.
142 Easterbrook, supra note 76, at 313 (discussing Upjohn Corp. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383 (1981)).
143 Id.
144 See supra Part I.A.1(a); see also Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice 244
(1981) ("[Ihe attorney-work product doctrine is, I think, best understood as the use of
secrecy to protect the lawyer's (and hence client's) investment in research and analysis of a




Furthermore, Easterbrook believes that discouraging preparation
would be on the whole beneficial. The bulk of litigation neither cre-
ates legal rules nor influences future behavior; it merely divides the
stakes among the parties. Efforts expended by the parties to influence
the stakes division, however, generally are not of benefit to society. 145
Easterbrook and others posit that parties tend to overinvest in the
stakes-dividing function of litigation,1" and evidentiary privileges fur-
ther encourage the overinvestment.
Making it easier for parties to litigation to keep secret the information
they generate will induce them to invest more in this activity. If
information creation in litigation is useful principally to divide the
stakes, then a stronger evidentiary privilege may exacerbate the prob-
lem of overinvestment while simultaneously-by denying the tribunal
access to evidence-making the outcome of cases less accurate and
reducing the rule-enforcement value of litigation. 147
The second article also analyzes work product as a property
right,148 although its authors believe that work product immunity
encourages not overinvestment but perseverance. The problem, they
say, is that attorneys investigating a case cannot develop only helpful
legal theories or facts. Rather, the process of preparing a case for trial
requires that attorneys engage in activities that may produce "bad"
information as easily as "good" information. The authors argue that
because the value of producing bad information is negative, 149 the net
value to the party of certain kinds of preparation may be very low,
although the value to society of that preparation being done is very
high. Work product immunity, they argue, is necessary to provide
adequate private incentive to investigate. 50 Again, this theory is very
145 Easterbrook, supra note 76, at 359-60.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 360-61; see also Gordon Tullock, Trials on Trial: The Pure Theory of Legal
Procedure 154-58, 359 (1980) (demonstrating the costs of overinvestment).
148 Positive Theory, supra note 11.
149 This argument overlooks or minimizes the value to a litigant of learning both good and
bad information. Unless the litigant has sole access to bad facts, there is always the danger
that the opponent will, on her own, discover those bad facts and use them at trial. These bad
facts can be minimized or manipulated effectively only to the extent the litigant is aware of
them. Therefore, there is value in trial preparation leading to awareness of bad as well as good
facts.
150 Positive Theory, supra note 11, at 3 85-97.
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much like the traditional argument that work product immunity is
necessary to encourage attorney diligence.151
This argument assumes that, with work product immunity, trial
preparation activities have some benefit to the party investigating in
addition to the inherent value of the information. This additional
value can have two sources: (1) the value of having the information
when the opponent does not have the information ("secrecy value");
and (2) the value of forcing the opponent to spend more time and
money to acquire the information ("opponent cost value"). By argu-
ing that work product immunity will encourage additional trial prepa-
ration, law and economics theorists are claiming that the secrecy
value and/or the opponent cost value can make investigation worth-
while when, without them, the cost of investigation would have
exceeded the information's inherent value.
For purposes of illustrating the point, consider the following exam-
ple. Plaintiff has sued defendant, and defendant is considering
whether to undertake certain trial preparations.
Investigation Cost = A
Inherent Value of Preparation = X
Opponent Cost Value = Y
Secrecy Value = Z
If the inherent value of the preparation X is greater than the investiga-
tion cost A, defendant will undertake the trial preparations regardless
of the existence or nonexistence of work product immunity. There
already is sufficient incentive for the preparations to be done. If the
total of the inherent value, the opponent cost value, and the secrecy
value [X + Y + Z] is less than the investigation cost A, defendant
will not do the trial preparations, even with the work product immu-
nity, because the costs exceed the benefits. The theoretical benefit of
work product protection, then, exists only in a narrow band of cases
in which the inherent value of the preparation is less than the cost of
investigation, but the addition of the opponent cost value or the
secrecy value makes the benefit of the preparation exceed its cost [X
< A < (X + Y + Z)]. This will be true only when the opponent
cost and secrecy values are greater than the amount by which the
11 See supra Part II.A.1(a).
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investigation cost exceeds the inherent value of the information [(Y +
Z) > (A -X)].
This possibility is comprehensible as a theoretical construct, but, as
argued above, 5 ' it is inconsistent with the nature of modem litiga-
tion. First, the inherent incentive to prepare for trial is very strong.
Second, as work product immunity exists in theory, it does not allow
the suppression of information. Therefore, although secrecy may well
exist in practice,153 in theory the work product rule does not protect
bad facts, so the secrecy value does not even exist in most cases. This
means that the opponent cost value alone must provide sufficient
additional incentive for increased trial preparation activity.
When will increasing an opponent's cost be sufficiently valuable to
a litigant that it might motivate additional trial preparation? Increas-
ing an opponent's cost is the most valuable when it affects either set-
tlement or an opponent's ability to prepare for trial, which in turn is
most likely to be possible when there is a marked disparity in
resources between the opponents. If the cost of investigating the
information for plaintiff is B, that cost will be the same whoever plain-
tiff is, but the value to defendant of imposing that cost on plaintiff
varies depending on the effect of that cost on plaintiff. If the cost is
sufficient to pressure plaintiff into a less desirable settlement, or if it is
sufficient to detract from plaintiff's trial preparation in other areas, Y
will be large, and the defendant will benefit substantially. Y therefore
is most likely to be an important factor in cases where one of the
litigants has limited resources compared to the cost of thorough prep-
aration. This most likely will be the case when defendant has either
greater resources or significantly lower cost, because defendant must
be able to afford to invest A in the preparation. If the cost of the trial
preparation is roughly the same for plaintiff and defendant [A = B],
defendant derives more benefit from spending A and forcing plaintiff
to spend A if defendant more easily can afford the expenditure. Alter-
natively, if the cost of the preparation is much lower for defendant
(as, for example, when defendant can informally interview employees,
and plaintiff must undertake formal discovery to secure the same
information), so that B > A, defendant is more likely to be able to
152 See supra text accompanying notes 61-74.
153 See infra text accompanying notes Part III.A.1.
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benefit by spending A and forcing plaintiff to spend B for the same
information.
When work product immunity does permit the protection of
secrets, (as, for example, where B is so high that plaintiff cannot
undertake the discovery), the question becomes when this secrecy
value will be sufficiently large to motivate additional trial preparation.
Secrecy is of the greatest value when the information to be kept secret
is very important and very helpful to the party who does not have the
information. In other words, Z will be high in cases in which defend-
ant has the power to hide bad facts from plaintiff, facts that either
would hurt defendant or would help plaintiff. The more central the
fact, and the more harmful to the party wishing to keep it secret, the
higher the value of Z.
From the perspective of the party deciding whether to undertake
trial preparation, then, there may be a limited number of situations in
which work product immunity will produce at least an incremental
increase in trial preparation. Work product immunity is most likely
to encourage further trial preparation in cases where a disparity in
resources can be exploited or where important facts can be kept from
the opponent and, therefore, from the trier of fact. But this analysis
looks at the problem solely from the litigant's perspective. Is this in
society's best interest?
Some law and economics theorists, like conventional defenders of
work product immunity, assume that the additional preparation is
always valuable to society, as opposed to merely valuable to the liti-
gant doing the preparation. 54 This is debatable. 5' Even if the adver-
sary system for trying cases is accepted without question, the two
situations in which additional preparation is encouraged do not result
in a more adversarial presentation of evidence. In the opponent cost
154 See Positive Theory, supra note 11, at 385, 388, 393. The authors argue that work
product protection is necessary to provide sufficient private incentive to investigate bad facts
and admit that work product protection suppresses information (and therefore encourages the
investigation). But they claim that somehow this suppressed information leads to the socially
desirable result of more accurate case outcomes. They therefore apparently assume that
although both sides are allowed to hide relevant facts, both sides do ultimately learn all
relevant facts, albeit at greater expense. It seems, as discussed in the text, that this final
assumption is inconsistent with the remainder of their theory, for the ability to hide bad facts is
of very little value if we must assume that the adversary ultimately will learn those bad facts.
155 See Easterbrook, supra note 76, at 359-61; see also infra Part III.C for a discussion of the
burden imposed on society by additional preparation in anticipation of litigation.
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scenario, the cost of discovery leads either to a warped settlement or
to damage to one party's ability to prepare for trial. In the secrecy
scenario, the trier of fact never gains access to the bad facts. 156 In
neither case is the truth-seeking function of the adversary system fur-
thered by the litigant's increased trial preparation.
Even if the additional preparation has some redeeming social value,
that value must be weighed against the cost to society of allowing the
protection.157 Those costs include the duplication of effort in the pro-
duction of information and the suppression of information from liti-
gants and the trier of fact.158  Part III of this Article explores the
nature of those costs and argues that the costs are both substantial
and unequally distributed.
III. THE COST OF WORK PRODUCT IMMUNITY
Part II of this Article demonstrated that work product immunity is
not necessary to accomplish the goals sought by its proponents. More
importantly, work product immunity imposes significant costs on the
legal system and on litigants. First, work product immunity hides
some information, makes other information available only in a less
useful form or at greater cost, and increases costs generally by
rewarding early and extensive attorney involvement in the process of
dispute resolution. Further, work product immunity aids repeat insti-
tutional defendants at the expense of individual plaintiffs. Institu-
tional defendants can structure their business so as to create work
product, and they benefit from complexity and discovery fights. By
156 See Easterbrook, supra note 76, at 360-61.
157 To continue the analysis suppose that:
Value to society of the increased preparation = D
Cost to society of duplicative investigation = B
Cost to society of decreased information to trier of fact = E
Cost to society of accuracy of case outcome = F
Despite the value of work product immunity to defendant, from the standpoint of the judicial
system, work product should be continued only if D > [B + E + F].
Note that this determination is wholly different from a determination of whether the addi-
tional preparation is worthwhile for defendant. Neither defendant's cost of investigation A nor
the benefit to defendant of the additional preparation X (or [X + Y + Z]) is a relevant varia-
ble in calculating the social benefit of the work product doctrine. Too many analysts of work
product, however, simply equate the benefit to defendant with the benefit to the judicial
system.
159 Law and economics writers acknowledge that these costs exist. See, e.g., Easterbrook,
supra note 76, at 362; Positive Theory, supra note 11, at 393.
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contrast, the suppression of information caused by work product
immunity is more damaging to plaintiffs who usually bear the bur-
den of proof. In instances in which protection would work more
evenhandedly, work product immunity tends to disappear. Finally,
work product immunity costs society in duplicated efforts, repeated
disputes, skewed case outcomes, and overuse of attorneys. The com-
bination of these costs indicates that the work product doctrine needs
serious reconsideration.
A. The Costs of Work Product Immunity to the Parties
In theory, the work product immunity does not hide facts. Rather,
it protects attorney thought processes while still requiring that facts
be disclosed. In operation, however, the result of work product
immunity is that information never reaches the party seeking discov-
ery or the trier of fact, or, alternatively, that the information the party
receives is in less useful form or at a higher cost.
L Work Product Immunity and the Suppression of Relevant
Information
Despite some claims to the contrary, I 9 many commentators believe
that the work product doctrine results in the suppression of relevant
information. 16° These intuitions are supported by empirical data.1 61
159 See, e.g., Developments, supra note 13, at 1033-37 (explaining that, by conducting an
independent inquiry, an attorney should be able to learn all of the facts the opposing side
possesses). Furthermore, "[w]hen one party is in a better position to know the source from
which relevant facts may be derived, moreover, the Federal Rules appear to afford alternative
means to redress the balance without offending the work-product doctrine." Id. at 1034.
160 See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 8, at 1282 ("[T]he price of protecting lawyers against the
folly of reliance on the other side ... is a rule which denies discovery of factual information
.... "); John J. Kennelly, Discovery-From the Standpoint of Plaintiffs, 18 Forum 150, 163
(1982) ("It is increasingly apparent that in some instances the high-sounding cliches pertaining
to 'work product' and 'attorney-client privilege,' when analyzed, are employed to cover up
relevant evidence.").
161 See Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers
About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 219; see also Brazil, supra
note 59, at 833 (An American Bar Foundation study of 180 Chicago area attorneys from many
different kinds of practices and sizes of firms asked whether privileges or statutory protections,
including work product, but excluding attorney-client privilege, had ever made their discovery
more difficult or caused them not to uncover or pursue information. The study found that
these privileges, of which work product was the most common, had impeded discovery in 10%
of all the attorneys' cases, and that more dramatically, the privileges impeded discovery in
50% of the cases handled by attorneys whose median case size was $1,000,000 or more.).
Virginia Law Review [Vol. 77:1515
There are a number of reasons that work product protection might
result in the suppression of relevant information. A party seeking dis-
covery may be unaware of the existence of information embodied in
work product.162 Sometimes, this may be due in part to the "silent
assertion" of the privilege. 163 Thus the holder of information makes
and rules on its own objection to discovery, and the party seeking
discovery may never know that the information exists in order to pur-
sue it in nonprotected form. A discovering party's lack of awareness
of information also may be attributable to opposing counsel's evasive-
ness coupled with a work product claim.164 When a holder of infor-
mation uses work product immunity to protect information in one
form, and then evades attempts to discover the information in non-
privileged form, the result easily may be that the information will
never be discovered.1 65 The combination of the work product claim
and less than completely candid answers may be misleading at best. 166
Sixty-one percent of the attorneys surveyed by the American Bar
162 Wells, supra note 10, at 685.
163 See Brazil, supra note 161, at 224 (defining "silent assertion" as "withholding
information in response to discovery requests. . . without informing the discovering party
either that additional information exists or that the party responding to the discovery is
claiming that the information is protected against disclosure by a privilege.").
164 See David L. Shapiro, Some Problems of Discovery in an Adversary System, 63 Minn.
L. Rev. 1055 (1979) (providing examples of the difficulty of learning facts and the existence of
unarticulated work product claims).
165 Indeed, another finding of the American Bar Foundation study was that many lawsuits
are terminated with serious information gaps. The study found that 25% of smaller, less
complicated lawsuits are terminated (by settlement or trial) with at least one party believing it
knows something of significance about the case that other parties have not discovered. More
than half of the larger, more complex cases are closed with at least one party believing it knows
something of significance that opposing parties do not know. One of the reasons for the
knowledge gap is the effect of discovery privileges. Brazil, supra note 161, at 234.
166 For example, in a case arising out of a car wreck, in answering interrogatories, defendant
stated that he had given a statement to the investigator for his insurance company and quoted
the statement as:
"The driver in front of me appeared to be slowing down so I was trying to pull into the
right lane. As I was fully over into the other lane the car ahead of me suddenly stopped
and the left front of my car contacted the rear of the car that was stopped in front of
me."
A. Harold Frost, The Ascertainment of Truth by Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 89, 94 (1960). When
plaintiffs later got a copy of the actual statement, they learned that the statement actually said:
"The driver in my lane in front of me appeared to be slowing down so I was trying to
pull into the right hand lane. As I was pulling over into this other lane, I misjudged the
car in front of me and the left front of my car struck the right rear of that car stopped in




Foundation complained about evasive tactics. 167 One remarkably
frank attorney noted that "[t]he purpose of discovery is to give as
little as possible so [your opponents] will have to come back and back
and maybe will go away or give up.' 168 Every attorney surveyed said
that, at some point in time, evasive responses had impeded his discov-
ery. 169 A discovering party, failing to ask exactly the right question in
exactly the right words to force a revelation of the information, may
never manage to gain access to the relevant information. 170
Work product immunity also may result in one-sided access to
information when the party seeking discovery lacks the money to
duplicate its opponent's work product. In this situation, the party
may be completely aware of its opponent's trial preparation but can-
not afford access to that information on its own.' 71 For example, a
plaintiff may not be able to afford to interview numerous far-flung
witnesses or to depose each witness individually if the witnesses are
the defendant's employees who refuse to give informal statements
voluntarily.
Work product immunity also may hide another kind of informa-
tion: the processes by which an opponent's facts have been developed.
Knowledge of these processes may be crucial to evaluating the credi-
bility of the opponent's "facts." Professor D. Christopher Wells gives
a dramatic example: "In proving that monkeys can be taught to
speak English, for example, the fact that the scientist rehearsed a par-
ticular script with them may be of no great relevance. In proving that
monkeys unvaryingly speak the truth, however, such a fact may be
crucial."' 7 2 Work product protection, however, makes the scientist's
rehearsal undiscoverable, and the reliability of our witness-monkeys
cannot be assessed thoroughly. To take a more "legal" example, con-
sider the deponent who has given a prior statement about a case to
one of the parties, or to that party's insurer or investigator. The fact
167 Brazil, supra note 59, at 829.
168 Id. at 829.
169 Id. at 835.
170 See, e.g., David A. Binder & Paul Bergman, Fact Investigation 341-42 (1984)
("[O]pposing counsel who are perfectly adept at surviving in a complex world may be suddenly
overwhelmed by purported ambiguities in the simplest of questions. For example, in one
notorious case an attorney did not produce a 'letter' from an expert because he did not
consider it an 'interim report.' ").
171 Waits, supra note 9, at 314.
172 Wells, supra note 10, at 686 n.45.
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that a deposition can be taken and questions asked will be used as an
indication that no facts are hidden by withholding the earlier state-
ment. Without access to that statement, however, the discovering
party cannot tell whether the deposition testimony differs from the
earlier statement.1 73 The discovering party also may miss relevant
areas of questioning that would have been suggested by the statement.
The same problem arises when a discovering party tries to learn
information about the witness' preparation for the deposition. Oppos-
ing counsel may have selected certain documents for the deponent to
study in preparation for the deposition. This selection easily may help
shape the deponent's testimony. 174 Nevertheless, discovery of this
selection process has been denied on the basis that the selection pro-
cess reflects the attorney's mental processes, even though none of the
documents themselves contain work product. 175
Work product immunity could be used even to prevent a discover-
ing party from learning whether its opponent has fully complied with
existing discovery requests. In Shelton v. American Motors Corp.,176
the defendants used the work product doctrine to prevent the plain-
tiff's attorney from asking the defendant's in-house counsel whether
everything responsive to the plaintiff's discovery requests had been
produced. 177 Again, the work product doctrine kept the discovering
party in the dark, allowing suppression of information that might
have led to the discovery of other potentially relevant documents.
When information is suppressed during discovery, its ultimate fate
depends on whether it is helpful to the party holding the information
or harmful to the party holding the information. If the case is settled,
173 See Waits, supra note 9, at 315-16. Nor can the litigant discover the earlier statement
because of the possibility of a discrepancy unless the litigant has some other evidence of the
discrepancy. Id. at 316 n.64.
174 Other kinds of witness preparation also may shape a deponent's testimony. In the
American Bar Foundation study, 95% of the responding attorneys said that the way they had
prepared a client or witness to be deposed had resulted in other parties not learning something
of arguable significance during the deposition. Brazil, supra note 59, at 819.
175 Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 315-19 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1985).
176 805 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1986).
177 Id. at 1329. The court in Shelton used the work product doctrine to prevent the
plaintiff's attorney from compelling the defendant's in-house counsel to answer questions
concerning the existence of specific documents relevant to the litigation because the court
believed that the attorney's selective recollections of specific documents would reveal her




the information probably never will be disclosed. If the information is
helpful to the party claiming work product immunity, that party can
wait until trial and produce the information (perhaps with suitable
dramatic flourish) as a surprise to its opponent. Trial by ambush is
resurrected by virtue of work product protection. If the information
is harmful to the party holding the information, it will never see the
light of day. The party with the information will not present it to the
trier of fact, and the adversary system will not function effectively
because the fact-finder is deprived of relevant information.
2. Work Product Immunity and the Disclosure of Information in
Less Useful Form
The work product doctrine admittedly denies parties access to cer-
tain documents. Its proponents claim, however, that the substantial
equivalent of the information contained in these documents is discov-
erable if a party properly frames its discovery request. Sometimes,
however, even a carefully worded request can retrieve only informa-
tion that is less useful.
One common example is the witness statement. In many cases, one
party (generally the defendant) takes statements from the witnesses to
an incident soon after the incident occurs. These statements are taken
when the events are fresh in the witnesses' minds. They may be taken
from potential plaintiffs, from neutral witnesses, and from witnesses
allied with the potential defendant. In many cases, these statements
will be held protected as work product 78 because they are taken by a
representative of a party in anticipation of litigation. Other parties to
the lawsuit will be denied access to these statements on the theory
that the "substantial equivalent" of the statement is available by inter-
viewing or deposing the witnesses. 179 Such interviews and deposi-
tions, however, often are taken weeks, months, or even years after the
incident. The witnesses' recollections may have weakened over time
or may have been enhanced or shaped by intervening conversations
178 See cases cited supra note 35, holding that witness' statements can be work product.
179 See, e.g., Brennan v. Engineered Prods., 506 F.2d 299 (8th Cir. 1974) (stating that
counsel should try to obtain own statement from witness); United States v. Chatham City
Corp., 72 F.R.D. 640 (S.D. Ga. 1976) (stating that counsel must interview potential witnesses
before seeking opponent's witness statements).
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with opposing counsel. Yet the original statements may remain
unavailable to discovering parties.180
The notion of the substantial equivalent of information also can
result in information that is less helpful substituting for the original,
more helpful source. Even if a party demonstrates that she is unable
to obtain the same information from the same person, a court will
deny a discovery request if it decides that another source provides
substantially equivalent information.18 For example, if the plaintiff is
seeking information regarding a traffic accident that gave rise to plain-
tiff's lawsuit, the police report of the accident may be considered the
substantial equivalent of reliable eyewitness testimony.182  Thus a
report, filtered through an intermediary scrivener and made for the
purpose of criminal investigation, substitutes for a witness state-
ment-a statement that is essentially a verbatim account, probably
more comprehensive in scope, and taken for purposes of the lawsuit in
question.
Another common situation in which information is available only
in less useful form arises when one party to the lawsuit has some kind
of computerized litigation support system, such as a computerized
data base or computerized index to relevant documents.' 83 This may
involve full-text storage of documents or may include only document
summaries or indexes.' 84
An example can illustrate the way in which the work product doc-
trine serves to make more useful computer data unavailable to the
180 Some courts find that a later interview is not the substantial equivalent of a
contemporaneous statement and allow discovery. Others allow discovery only if the
discovering party shows that the witness in question was unavailable to the discovering party
for a substantial time after the incident. Others treat only statements given within one or two
weeks of the incident as contemporaneous. See Special Project, supra note 16, at 804-06.
181 Id. at 802-03.
182 See id. at 803.
183 K. Rigbaum, Note, Computerized Litigation Support Systems and the Attorney Work
Product Doctrine: The Need for Court Support Against Discovery, 17 Val. U. L. Rev. 281
(1983).
184 See Robert C. Cook & Scott 0. Reed, Discovery of Computerized Litigation Support
Systems, 33 Trial Law. Guide 38, 38-39 (1989). For general information concerning discovery
of computer systems, see C.J. Poirier, Gary C. Robb & Joel R. Mosher, Computer-Based
Litigation Support Systems: The Discoverability Issue, 54 UMKC L. Rev. 440 (1986); Philip J.
Schworer, Problems Arising from the Creation of a Computer-Based Litigation Support
System, 14 N. Ky. L. Rev. 263 (1987); Richard M. Long, Comment, The Discovery and Use of
Computerized Information: An Examination of Current Approaches, 13 Pepp. L. Rev. 405
(1986); Rigbaum, supra note 183, at 201.
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discovering party when less useful hard copy can be produced. In an
antitrust suit, In re IBM Peripherals,"8 5 the plaintiffs filed interrogato-
ries asking whether IBM had recorded in a computer system the doc-
uments plaintiffs had demanded in other written discovery. IBM
responded that its attorneys had developed a computerized trial sup-
port system and contended that the system contained documents as
well as summaries of some of the requested documents.18 6 The trial
court found that the system reflected IBM attorney mental impres-
sions and thought processes in a way that would not lend itself to
segregation of the protected information and so denied access to the
computer system.18 7 Assuming that plaintiffs did have access to all of
the data contained in the IBM computer system, plaintiffs were not
denied "facts." The facts they were given, however, were in much less
useful form. In the interest of protecting attorney thought processes
in selecting or abstracting the documents, or in the interest of protect-
ing the money a party spent in creating the data base, the discovering
party is left with information that is available in theory, but unavaila-
ble in fact (or available only after a long and costly search) because of
the difficulty of finding relevant data in a huge volume of documents.
One commentator gives the following example of the disadvantage
to a litigant denied access to a computerized litigation support system:
During the discovery phase in an antitrust action, the defendant con-
verts all of its business records, including pricing announcements,
from its Midwest marketing department into the database of a com-
puter support system. The plaintiff has alleged that the defendant
maintains its market position by lowering prices below cost (preda-
tory pricing) and needs documentary support for the allegation. The
plaintiff asks for all pricing announcements from the defendant's
Midwest marketing department. The defendant responds by produc-
185 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 878 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
186 Id. at 878-79.
187 Id. at 859. This finding was despite plaintiffs' statement to the trial court that "'we
don't want their work product. We want them to use their work product, though... and to
the extent that would facilitate their production of documents responsive to our requests, it
should be used.'" Friedman, supra note 42, at 1475 n.49 (1981) (citing the Pretrial Hearing
Transcript of In re IBM Peripherals); see also Manual for Complex Litigation Second § 21.446,
at 60 n.79 (1986) [hereinafter Manual] (suggesting that computer systems that will not be
introduced into evidence will be protected as work product). But see also United States v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1300-01 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (allowing intervention to
raise work product claim for computerized litigation support system).
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ing one million documents, while only one hundred of them indicate
predatory pricing.188
It will take the plaintiff months or years and a substantial amount of
money to sift manually through the voluminous materials. If, how-
ever, the plaintiff could discover the defendant's computer support
system, it might take only minutes to locate the needed documents. 1 9
Under current law, the computer support system undoubtedly will
be considered work product.190 The discovering party can try to get
access to the computer system by claiming that it has substantial need
of the system and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain its substan-
tial equivalent. Many courts, however, hold that financial inability of
the discovering party to obtain manually the needed information does
not show undue hardship, nor does the fact that the computer system
will expedite proceedings show substantial need. 91 To the extent that
a computer system is considered opinion work product, even a show-
ing of substantial need and undue hardship will be insufficient to
allow production to opposing counsel. 192 The work product immu-
nity, under these circumstances, leaves the discovering party with
access to the information only in less helpful form. 93
3. Work Product Immunity and Information Available Only at
Greater Cost
Sometimes information in documents protected by work product
immunity can be obtained only at greater cost in time and money.
Work product immunity raises costs for at least three reasons. First,
188 Rigbaum, supra note 183, at 285-86.
189 Id. at 286. For a discussion of the advantages of computerized support systems
generally, see Steven J. Olson & Leon R. Goodrich, Litigation Support Systems-Present
Status and Future Use, 11 Forum 832 (1976).
190 Manual, supra note 187, § 21.446, at 60 n.79; Long, supra note 184, at 409-10.
191 See Friedman, supra note 42, at 1485-86.
192 See id. at 1487.
193 Some commentators have suggested that litigation support systems should be
discoverable in at least certain circumstances, especially when one litigant is financially unable
to duplicate its opponent's system. See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman & Stephen 0. Kinnard, The
Development, Discovery, and Use of Computer Support Systems in Achieving Efficiency in
Litigation, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 267 (1979). These suggestions, although motivated by
considerations of policy, are not consistent with the courts' work product decisions in other
areas and so might require an amendment of the federal rules to achieve even the limited




when a document is protected by work product immunity, the discov-
ering party must undertake its own duplicative discovery to learn the
same information. Even supporters of the work product doctrine
admit that work product immunity results in duplication of efforts.194
Examples of these added costs are numerous. A party denied a wit-
ness statement must instead undertake its own independent interview
of the witness. If the witness will not voluntarily make a statement,
the party must resort to the vastly more expensive procedure of taking
the witness' deposition. 95 A party denied the use of an opponent's
litigation support system must spend (if it can afford to do so) the
time and money to develop its own independent system.1 96 A party
denied access to a document often must use multiple waves of discov-
ery, including interrogatories, depositions, requests for admission, and
document production requests to ferret out the information contained
in that protected document. In these situations, and in others, the
information ultimately may be available to the discovering party, but
it clearly is available only at a higher cost.
Second, in order to discover information protected as ordinary
work product, a discovering party must show that she has substantial
need for the information and that she is unable to obtain the substan-
tial equivalent of the information without undue hardship. 191 Courts
require the discovering party to go to great lengths to make this show-
ing. It is not enough for a party to allege substantial need and undue
hardship. The party actually must try, but fail, to obtain the informa-
tion contained in requested documents. 198  A party seeking work
product to impeach a witness must "show a strong possibility that the
materials requested will in fact impeach the witness;" this, too,
imposes costs on the discovering party.199 This need for unsuccessful
194 See, e.g., Positive Theory, supra note 11, at 393 ("A party must often incur duplicative
costs to produce the same information that the opponent is normally entitled to suppress.").
195 A deposition requires, at minimum, filing a notice of deposition with the court and
serving it on other parties to the lawsuit. If the witness is not a party or under the control of a
party, the witness will have to be subpoenaed. Taking a deposition also requires paying a court
reporter, a cost that will run easily into the hundreds of dollars. Furthermore, if the witness
chooses to fight the subpoena, the cost of getting the information also will include the costs of
litigating the motion to quash.
196 See supra text accompanying notes 188-93.
197 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
198 Special Project, supra note 16, at 801.
199 Id. at 802.
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efforts at duplication or for proof of discrepancies imposes a cost in
both time and money on the party seeking discovery.2 °"
Third, disputes about what should be classified as work product
increase the parties' cost of discovery. When litigants claim that
material is protected by the work product rule, a party will be able to
discover that material only by filing a motion to compel discovery,
frequently accompanied by a brief and frequently requiring an eviden-
tiary hearing. Even if the document ultimately is provided, erroneous
claims of work product immunity increase the discovering party's
cost of obtaining the information. The vagueness of the work product
doctrine itself exacerbates this third problem. The application of the
work product doctrine requires a balancing of values as well as adju-
dication of disputed facts. This in turn has resulted in a work product
doctrine of great complexity, and complex doctrines tend to engender
more fights.2 "1 The lack of clarity about the parameters of work prod-
uct immunity and its exceptions encourages litigation, making the
doctrine one of the most litigated discovery exemptions. 0 2
The problem also is exacerbated by many attorneys' willingness to
use discovery for tactical purposes. For example, eighty percent of
the attorneys surveyed in the American Bar Foundation poll stated
that gaining time or slowing down part or all of an action had been a
factor affecting their use of discovery tools, including asserting techni-
cal or questionable objections to discovery. 20 3 Seventy-seven percent
of the attorneys also indicated that their desire to impose "'work
burdens or economic pressure' " on another party or attorney affected
200 This higher cost will not provide the key to unlock the suppressed information. Most
courts hold that the cost to the discovering party of obtaining information is not a sufficient
showing of substantial need or undue hardship. See Gergacz, supra note 94, at 7-47 to -48;
Special Project, supra note 16, at 810; Developments, supra note 13, at 1036. For cases
adopting this approach, see, e.g., In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 616 (N.D. Tex. 1981)
(finding that even if cost to discovering party, unless prohibitive, is very high, this alone is not
showing of substantial need or undue hardship).
201 See Waits, supra note 9, at 322. Complexity also tends to favor wealthier litigants.
"[A]s the process becomes more complex, increasingly it can be used effectively only by
players who can deploy the resources to play on the requisite scale." Marc Galanter, Reading
the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About
Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 4, 45-46 (1983).
202 4 James W. Moore, Jo D. Lucas & George J. Grotheer, Jr., Moore's Federal Practice
26.63[1], at 26-310 (2d ed. 1991); see also Cooper, supra note 8, at 1318 (stating that
litigation over witness statements wanted for purposes of impeachment forms "the largest body
of [discovery] case law").
203 Brazil, supra note 59, at 852 & n.99.
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their discovery behavior,2° 4 such as asserting objections to discov-
ery.205 One attorney commented that "'by being an obstructionist
you can avoid providing about 80 percent of the information because
it's expensive for [an] opponent to go to court to compel
discovery.' "206
The combination of an amorphous doctrine, adversarial attorney
behavior, and the potential importance of work product materials
make disputes about work product protection inevitable. And the
mere fact of having to litigate the discoverability of the information,
even if the information ultimately is held to be discoverable, increases
the cost of that information to the discovering party.
B. The Comparative Impact of Work Product Immunity
The preceding Section of this Article demonstrated that the work
product doctrine imposes costs on the litigants: (1) the cost of making
some information unavailable; (2) the cost of making other informa-
tion available only in less useful form; and (3) the cost in time as well
as in money of requiring duplicative investigation and preparation
and of litigating work product issues. These costs are substantial,
especially when balanced against the insignificant benefits of the work
product doctrine. 20 7 The problem, however, is even worse because
these costs are not distributed evenly across litigant groups. Protec-
tion of work product tends to favor institutional litigants,0 8 especially
repeat litigants, at the expense of individual litigants, and it tends to
favor defendants at the expense of plaintiffs. 209
204 Id. at 856-57.
205 Id. at 856.
206 Id.
207 See supra Part II, demonstrating the insignificant benefits of protecting work product.
208 By the term "institutional litigants," I include private organizations such as corporations
and partnerships as well as government entities. I also include litigants who are nominally
individuals, such as doctors in medical malpractice claims, but who are actually represented by
insurance companies and their attorneys. The involvement of the insurance company carries
with it the benefits of the insurance company's experience as a repeat litigant.
209 In the context of major commercial litigation with large, equally wealthy institutions on
both sides of the docket, the impact of work product may be more even. Institutional
commercial litigation plaintiffs may not be as disadvantaged by work product immunity,
although the fact that they carry the burden of proof still may cause them to be more
disadvantaged than institutional defendants. In many other kinds of litigation, however, such
as personal injury, professional malpractice, products liability, consumer fraud, civil rights,
employment discrimination, and even certain kinds of antitrust and securities claims, a smaller
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This proposition seems intuitively true because institutional defend-
ants have a superior ability to structure their dealings so as to create
more work product, and they benefit more from delay. In addition,
because plaintiffs have the burden of proof, they are more likely to be
harmed by a denial of access to information. Various empirical data
support these intuitions. Finally, this uneven effect is exaggerated by
the parameters of the work product doctrine and particularly by
recent developments that compel the disclosure of certain "work
product-type" information as part of a pretrial conference or pretrial
order.
L The Theory of the Benefits of Work Product Immunity to
Institutional Defendants
For purposes of analyzing the comparative impact of work product
protection, it is helpful to divide litigants into two groups: "one-shot-
ters," claimants who have only occasional recourse to the courts, and
"repeat players," parties who are engaged in many similar litigations
over time.210 Typically, repeat players have a number of advantages
as litigants. First, repeat players have greater ability to structure
future transactions so as to build an appropriate record. Second,
repeat players tend to have advantages of expertise, greater access to
specialists, economies of scale, and lower start-up costs for any given
case. Finally, repeat players can litigate for rules as well as for imme-
diate gains.211 In other words, they can benefit by spending an
amount of money disproportionate to the value of a particular lawsuit
because they stand to gain in future lawsuits from the rules made in
the first suit.212
Take an example: In a personal injury case involving an allegedly
defective product, the individual plaintiff has been involved unexpect-
edly in a litigation-creating event. She may be a person of limited
means, and she has no established machinery for investigating or
resolving the problem. If seriously injured, she may be medically
one-shot litigant plaintiff will be facing a larger repeat litigant defendant (including insurers of
nominally one-shot defendants) and thus will be at a significant disadvantage.
210 Galanter, supra note 12, at 97.
211 See id. at 98-100.
212 See id. at 100. Also, the larger number of cases in which repeat players are involved
makes it possible for them to adjudicate and to appeal (as opposed to settling) only those cases
that they regard as most likely to produce favorable rules.
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unable to pursue her claim for some time after the injury. When the
litigation begins, she has little or no knowledge of the facts other than
her own use of the product and her own injuries. On the other hand,
the institutional defendant who manufactured the product already
may have a staff or insurer trained in investigating consumer com-
plaints and problems with its products. The manufacturer (or its
insurance company) need only assign an existing employee to investi-
gate the case, thus keeping its start-up costs low. It also benefits from
existing in-house expertise with regard to the product and detailed
knowledge about the development, design, and manufacture of the
product, before it even begins an individual investigation of the plain-
tiff's case. Whatever the costs of the investigation, the repeat litigant
can spread those costs over multiple cases of multiple plaintiffs
injured by the same product." 3 All of this provides an advantage and
means that the manufacturer will have a potentially invaluable wealth
of information about the case.
An institutional defendant who can plan for the occurrence of
claims such as the plaintiff's has still another advantage. It can struc-
ture its investigation to maximize the chances that its investigations
will be held to be work product and thus shielded from discovery.214
For example, the manufacturer may have a policy of always calling its
attorneys immediately on learning of an injury, so that any ensuing
investigation can be said to have been done under the attorney's direc-
tion. This makes it more likely that a court will find the investigation
to have been done in anticipation of litigation.215 Further, the manu-
facturer can leave a paper trail intended to demonstrate that it meets
all the requirements of the work product rule. The manufacturer also
213 A manufacturer of a product that may injure a large number of persons in the same or
similar ways can benefit from this kind of cost-spreading. For example, the manufacturer of a
car that unexpectedly shifts gears, the manufacturer of a birth control device that injures its
users, or the manufacturer of a punch press that injures a number of workers all can anticipate
multiple lawsuits raising the same legal and factual issues. Although the facts of a particular
plaintiff's injuries may vary, certain issues such as the defectiveness of the product and the
adequacy of any warnings given will remain largely the same from case to case.
214 Institutional defendants also have a greater ability to structure their affairs so as to shield
information through the attorney-client privilege, especially in a jurisdiction taking a "subject
matter" approach to privilege in the corporate setting. The impact of corporate attorney-client
privilege, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
215 See Special Project, supra note 16, at 847; Robert H. Oberbillig, Note, Work Product
Discovery: A Multifactor Approach to the Anticipation of Litigation Requirement in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), 66 Iowa L. Rev. 1277, 1291-93 (1981).
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can choose to litigate the work product issue whatever its expense,
again able to spread that cost over multiple lawsuits. It also can
choose to litigate cases that are most likely to produce pro-work prod-
uct rules. As a class of litigants that is most likely to do early, exten-
sive investigation, repeat litigants are the primary beneficiaries of that
portion of the work product doctrine that protects the embodiment of
such investigations from discovery.2 16
Defendants can benefit not only from actual work product protec-
tion, but also from the ability to fight about work product protection
and thus delay the ultimate resolution of the lawsuit. Defendants can
benefit from delay both by postponing the necessity to pay the plain-
tiff and by increasing the chances that the passage of time will impair
the quality of evidence and make it more difficult for the plaintiff to
meet her burden of proof.2 17
Finally, those with established power in society tend to appear, in
many cases, in court as defendants. 218 At the outset of a lawsuit,
these same defendants mostly likely have the bulk of relevant infor-
mation without the need to do discovery, while plaintiffs tend not to
have such information. Furthermore, defendants also are less likely
to find themselves in a position of having to extract evidence from
opponents to prove any affirmative defenses. 219 When work product
immunity results in the plaintiffs' inability to secure information,
however, it has a disproportionate impact on plaintiffs because plain-
tiffs usually have the burden of proof.
216 See Waits, supra note 9, at 324-25.
217 See Thomas W. Church, Jr., Jo-Lynne Q. Lee, Teresa Tan, Alan Carlson & Virginia
McConnell, Pretrial Delay: A Review and Bibliography 12-13 (1978) [hereinafter Pretrial
Delay].
218 See 23 Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure:
Evidence § 5422, at 674 (1980).
219 See id. Even when an institutional litigant appears as a plaintiff suing an individual
defendant as, for example, when a corporation sues an individual on a debt, the institutional
litigant already tends to have the information needed to prove its case. Contrast this with the
situation of an individual injured by a defective product who needs to discover extensive
information about the way in which the product was designed, manufactured, and distributed
in order to prove her case.
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2. Evidence Supporting the Theory that Institutional Defendants
Benefit from Work Product Immunity
The theoretical analysis of the structure of American lawsuits in
the previous Section suggests that the costs of the work product doc-
trine are borne primarily by individual plaintiffs. There is evidence to
support this belief. Some evidence comes from defendants' behavior,
some from empirical studies of discovery and discovery abuse, and
some from a survey of work product case law.
First, it appears that institutional defendants and their attorneys
believe that they benefit from work product protection.220 Defendants
and defense attorneys as a group have been vocal in their defense of
the work product doctrine. Some insurance-oriented journals, for
example, represent the work product doctrine to be virtually essential
to the maintenance of civilization as we know it.22 Companies with
the potential to be repeat defendants also figure prominently as amici
curiae in cases defending or expanding work product protection. In
Shelton v. American Motors Corp., which defined an attorney's selec-
tion of relevant documents as work product,222 the parties filing amici
briefs included the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the
United States, the Defense Research Institute, Inc., and thirty-one of
the largest corporations in the United States.223
Empirical research regarding discovery behavior also supports a
belief that defendants benefit from disputes regarding the work prod-
uct doctrine. Although the studies do not tie certain behaviors exclu-
sively to work product, they do provide evidence that institutional
220 See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 8, at 1325 ("It may not be unduly cynical to surmise that
lawyers who believe that they or their clients typically have superior means of obtaining
witness statements will tend to oppose discovery .... ").
221 See, e.g., Kane, supra note 55, at 130 (author, whose biographical sketch notes that his
"entire practice has been in the field of insurance law," stating that "the real bulwark and
strongest hope for the preservation of the adversary legal system lies in the concept of the
attorney's work product").
222 Shelton v. American Motors Corp, 805 F.2d 1323, 1329 (8th Cir. 1986).
223 These corporations were Aluminum Co. of America, American Cyanamid Co., Atlantic
Richfield Co., Bethlehem Steel Corp., Celanese Corp., Chevron Corp., The Coca-Cola Co.,
Dart & Kraft, Inc., Deere & Co., Delta Air Lines, Inc., The Greyhound Corp., Hershey Foods
Corp., IBM Corp., Kraft, Inc., Lukens, Inc., Mobil Corp., Monsanto Co., National Steel
Corp., Owens-Ililois, Inc., PPG Industries, Inc., RCA Corp., Reynolds Metals Co.,
Robertshaw Controls Co., Sears, Roebuck & Co., Texaco, Inc., Texas Instruments, Inc.,
Transtechnology Corp., TRW, Inc., U.S. Steel Corp., Westinghouse Electric Corp., and
Westvaco Corp.. Cook & Reed, supra note 184, at 54-55.
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litigants and defendants are more apt to use doctrines such as the
work product doctrine to strategic advantage224 and are more likely to
benefit from delay and from discovery disputes.225 The Civil Litiga-
tion Research Project found that the amount of time parties were
forced to spend on discovery fights correlated directly with their suc-
cess ratio226 and that the impact on plaintiffs was different from the
impact on defendants. 227  For plaintiffs, the longer a case lasts, the
lower the ratio of recovery to fees.228 In cases in which an above aver-
age amount of time must be spent on discovery and discovery dis-
putes, the plaintiff also recovers less in relation to the amount at stake
in the lawsuit.229  For defendants, however, if a defense attorney
spends a greater than average amount of time on discovery, the
defendant's success ratio increases. 230 Furthermore, one study found
that plaintiffs tend to suffer not only financially but emotionally the
longer the duration of a lawsuit, although institutional defendants do
not.231
224 A different study demonstrates that some defendants' resistance to discovery often is
unfounded, either because of a mistaken belief in the existence of a privilege or because
objections are being used for strategic purposes such as delay and harassment. The Federal
Judicial Center studied cases in which discovery had been a problem. They learned that in
cases in which the discovery disputes stemmed from resistance to discovery, 54% of the
plaintiffs' motions to compel discovery were granted, although only slightly more than 7% of
the defendants' motions for protective order were granted. Joseph L. Ebersole & Barlow
Burke, Discovery Problems in Civil Cases 44-47 (1980).
225 For example, the American Bar Foundation study found that "attorneys who spent 50
percent or more of their time representing large corporate clients.., were likely to have used
discovery to 'gain time' in 30 percent (median) to 46 percent (mean) of their cases," although
attorneys who got most of their work from individual clients "used discovery for purposes of
delay in only 10 percent (median) to 26 percent (mean) of their cases." See Brazil, supra note
59, at 852-53. Similarly, "attorneys who committed 75 percent or more of their time to
defendants' matters" said the hope "to 'gain time' had affected their discovery in 28 percent
(median) to 39 percent (mean) of their cases; those figures were 15 percent (median) and 27
percent (mean) for the group of predominantly plaintiffs' lawyers." Id. at 853.
226 See David M. Trubek, Austin Sarat, William L.F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer & Joel
B. Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 72, 81, 114-17 (1983)
(study of 1649 civil cases in federal and state courts).
227 Id. at 112-19.
228 Id. at 112.
229 Id. at 113, 116.
230 Id. at 119. The large law firms representing institutional defendants also benefit from
discovery disputes. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 73, at 295-96.
231 See Paul R.J. Connolly & Saundra Smith, The Litigant's Perspective on Delay: Waiting
for the Dough, 8 Just. Sys. J. 271, 276-77 (1983).
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These statistics support an inference that defendants are in a posi-
tion to benefit from disputes about work product. Not surprisingly,
therefore, the statistics also indicate that defense attorneys are more
likely than plaintiffs' attorneys to use discovery disputes to gain an
advantage over their opponents. 3 2 A survey of reported work prod-
uct case law, in both federal and state courts, 2 33 shows that a clear
majority of work product disputes arise out of defendants' resistance
to providing information to plaintiffs. A noticeable percentage of
these cases stems from the work product claims of insurance compa-
nies.234 These statistics, because they are incomplete, are impression-
istic rather than scientific, but they appear to be consistent across
jurisdictional lines and to occur both in jurisdictions following the
232 Studies have found significant differences between plaintiffs and defendants in the
deliberate use of delay. See Pretrial Delay, supra note 217, at 12 (concluding that "[p]arties to
a lawsuit do not suffer equally from delay. In fact . . . civil . . . defendants may have
considerable [advantage] to gain from protracted court processing.").
233 Data from reported cases, of course, can represent only a small portion of the disputes
about work product. Many jurisdictions do not report trial court decisions where most of the
day-to-day decisions about work product are made. Even those jurisdictions, such as the
federal courts, that do report trial court opinions report only some disputes about work
product. To a large extent, then, the appellate case law represents only those disputes that
were important enough to one of the parties to generate an appeal or interlocutory review
through some kind of discretionary writ. Nevertheless, these reported cases do indicate some
interesting trends in the use of work product claims.
234 For example, of the 69 cases cited by Moore's Federal Practice to illustrate work product
issues arising after the 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 52 arise out
of defendants' work product claims, and only 17 arise out of plaintiffs' work product claims.
The same trend appears at the state level. For example, of 12 reported work product cases in
Louisiana decided under its current work product statute, 11 involved defendants claiming
work product; 7 of those cases involved insurance companies. In Rhode Island, of 6 reported
cases involving work product, 5 involved defendants claiming work product; and at least 4 of
those cases involved insurance companies. In Pennsylvania, following the adoption of its new
work product rule, of 9 reported work product cases, 7 involved work product claims by
defendants and 2 by plaintiffs; 3 of the cases involved work product claims by insurance
companies. In Texas, there are 23 reported cases from 1987 through June of 1989 involving
work product claims. Of these, 22 involved work product claims made by defendants; at least
13 of these involved work product claims by insurance companies.
The data discussed above come from an original survey, and the results are on file with the
author and the Virginia Law Review Association. Because of the large volume of work
product cases, both in the federal courts and at the state level, I do not claim to have read all of
the existing cases. Rather, the results noted here represent an incomplete informal survey
generated by reading treatises, case annotations to the relevant discovery rules, and by
searching LEXIS for cases referring to work product, trial preparation, or the discovery rule in
issue. The data are sufficiently consistent to convince me that, at least at the level of reported
cases, work product claims by defendants will outnumber work product claims by plaintiffs in
any American jurisdiction.
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federal model and in states adopting a variant approach to work prod-
uct protection.
These data support the theory, described in Section 1 above, that
repeat institutional litigants and defendants are in a better position to
create work product, to benefit more from the substantive application
of the work product doctrine, and to benefit more from litigating
work product issues than plaintiffs and individual litigants.
3. The Disappearance of Post-Filing Work Product Immunity
Before information can be protected as work product, it must have
been developed in anticipation of litigation. Once an actual lawsuit is
under way, all parties usually will be represented by counsel, all of
whom will busily generate work product. One would think, therefore,
that work product protection would operate evenhandedly at least in
the area of post-filing opinion work product. The parameters of the
work product doctrine, changes in discovery practice, and the advent
of the modem pretrial order, however, have limited much of the even-
handed portions of work product protection. Where the work prod-
uct doctrine would tend to provide similar protection for all litigants,
it is nonexistent or diluted. Further, its dilution has come in ways
that tend to benefit defendants more than plaintiffs.
Proponents of work product immunity argue that the doctrine is
necessary to protect the attorney's thought processes, yet much of an
attorney's thought process is now discoverable. First, work product
has been defined so that it does not protect a party's legal theories.23
Thus a form of attorney thought process in which work product pro-
tection would operate evenhandedly is not even protected by the work
product doctrine. Further, parties must reveal, at least to some
extent, their legal and factual contentions in pleadings. In many juris-
dictions, plaintiffs' pleadings must contain more detail than defend-
ants', thereby revealing more of the plaintiffs' attorneys' thought
processes. 36
235 See Special Project, supra note 16, at 837 ("Legal theories upon which a party intends to
rely are not protected as work product."). See generally Cooper, supra note 8, at 1284-93
(discussing the reasons for and against allowing discovery of legal theories).
236 In Texas, for example, plaintiffs must plead a "cause of action," giving defendant fair
notice of both legal theories and their factual support. Tex. R. Civ. P. Ann. r. 45 op. of
Subcommittee on Interpretation of Rules (West 1979). Defendants, on the other hand, need
only plead a general denial, unless they want to raise certain disfavored defenses such as usury
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Moreover, parties can now use interrogatories and requests for
admission to ask for facts supporting legal theories and the applica-
tion of law to facts.237 This eliminates what would have been a source
of work product protection for attorneys on both sides. Again,
though, the rule tends to operate so as to favor defendants: the ques-
tions cannot be too broad in scope, and a defendant with the advan-
tage of plaintiff's specific pleading of her legal theory will be better
equipped to draft a discovery request that will be enforced by the
court.2 38
Finally, although decisions about trial strategy-who will be called
as witnesses, what documents or other demonstrative evidence will be
introduced, what legal and fact issues really will be contested at
trial-still are held to be work product in some jurisdictions,239 courts
more and more frequently require attorneys to reveal trial strategy as
part of a pretrial order. Increasingly, many trial courts routinely pro-
vide for the disclosure of the identity of trial witnesses, frequently
with a brief summary of the facts or issues as to which each will tes-
tify, as well as for disclosure of all trial exhibits, statements of legal
theories upon which attorneys will rely, and detailed statements of
factual contentions.24 Judge J. Skelly Wright, in a discussion of pre-
trial conferences, notes that judges in routine cases often "make each
side disgorge completely and absolutely everything about its case. '2 41
In complex cases, Judge Wright indicates that the courts require as to
each proposed finding of fact:
or capacity. See Tex. R. Civ. P. Ann. r. 92-94 (West 1979). Thus the pleadings provide
defendant with far more information about the plaintiff's attorney's thought process than they
give the plaintiff about the defendant's attorney's thought process. Even under the federal
system, the plaintiff must plead its claim, and the defendant need only admit or deny those
claims and plead affirmative defenses in a conclusory manner. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
237 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b) & 36(a).
238 See generally Special Project, supra note 16, at 837-38 (regarding the courts' preference
for focused rather than broad inquiries about legal theories and facts supporting legal
theories).
239 See sources cited supra notes 47-48.
240 See Cooper, supra note 8, at 1328-29.
241 Wright, supra note 105, at 144; see also Richard L. Marcus, Completing Equity's
Conquest? Reflections on the Future of Trial Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 725, 743-45 (1989) (discussing the trend in some cases to require elaborate
pretrial submissions including direct testimony); Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a
Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 Cal. L. Rev.
770 (1981) (discussing pretrial procedures in the Northern District of California).
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a list of the witnesses who are going to establish that proposal,
together with a summation of their testimony, together with a list of
the documents and an attachment to the proposal of those
documents.
Now, that would be as to each and every proposed stipulation of
fact; and, of course, with reference to the conclusions of law, they
would be supported by the citations of authority.'za
Thus this kind of trial-strategy opinion work product, which affects
different kinds of litigants evenly, essentially is not protected any-
more. Contrast this with ordinary work product arising out of fact
investigation, which is more likely to be held by defendants and still is
very much protected. Pro-defendant work product protection is alive
and well; evenhanded work product protection is dying fast. This
accentuates the tendency of the work product doctrine to benefit
defendants and institutional litigants at the expense of plaintiffs and
individual litigants.
A relatively new development in pretrial procedure also tends to
force the revelation of plaintiff work product. Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an attorney signing pleadings
"has read the pleading... [and] that to the best of the signer's knowl-
edge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law.' 243 An opponent who questions 'whether pleadings are sup-
ported by facts or law may file a motion seeking sanctions under Rule
11. Empirical research on the application of Rule 11 indicates that it
is used most often by defendants challenging plaintiffs' claims. 2" A
plaintiff's attorney, in defending his or her decision to file and pursue
the lawsuit, must reveal the facts known to the attorney, the nature of
the attorney's "reasonable inquiry," and the attorney's legal theories
in order to avoid Rule 11 sanctions. All of these matters ordinarily
would be protected by the work product doctrine, but the benefit of
242 Wright, supra note 105, at 150; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 (pretrial conference rule);
Tex. R. Civ. P. Ann. r. 166 (West Supp. 1991) (same); Manual for Complex Litigation §§ 3.30,
3.60 (5th ed. 1982) (suggesting schedules for filing of pretrial briefs, lists of witnesses,
stipulations of fact, and other information).
243 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
244 See Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling"
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 Geo. L.J. 1313, 1328
(1986).
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the protection is overcome by the need to protect the attorney and the
attorney's client from potentially gigantic sanctions.24 Once again,
procedural rules operate to eliminate work product immunity in a
way that tends to hurt plaintiffs more than defendants.
C. The Cost of Work Product Immunity to Society
Sections A and B discussed the cost that the work product doctrine
imposes on the parties to litigation. The doctrine also imposes costs
on society.2 46 First, work product immunity encourages each litigant
to prepare for trial completely and independently. This results in
duplication of effort, which imposes costs not only on the litigants
who must pay for the preparation, but also on society. 4 7 This dupli-
cative expenditure of time and money means that resources are being
wasted on preparation for litigation.24
Second, work product immunity tends to generate disputes sepa-
rate from the merits of the case. Empirical data indicates that work
product claims are the most litigated discovery disputes.249 Forcing
the courts to referee these disputes increases the problems of delay
and docket backlog in the trial courts. When a decision about a work
product issue requires that the court conduct an in camera inspection
of the disputed documents, 2 0 or an evidentiary hearing,25 1 even
greater costs arise. All these costs are passed on at least partially to
the public both in terms of delayed case outcomes and in terms of
increased costs of administering the judicial system.
245 See, e.g., Chapman & Cole v. Itel Container Int'l, 865 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1989)
(sanctions against third-party plaintiff); Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., 135 F.R.D. 139
(M.D. La. 1991) (sanctions against plaintiffs and attorneys totalling $323,532.92).
246 Because taxpayers rather than litigants pay the costs of operating the courts, the social
and private costs, even when measured solely in terms of dollars, will diverge. Trubek, Sarat,
Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, supra note 226, at 78-79.
247 See Easterbrook, supra note 76, at 362; Positive Theory, supra note 11, at 393.
248 See Garrity, supra note 32, at 27.
249 See Moore, Lucas & Grotheer, supra note 202, 26.63[l]; Developments, supra note 13,
at 1027.
250 An in camera inspection allows the court to examine the disputed documents to
determine issues such as the identity of the writer, the identity of the recipients, the subject
matter of the document, and the document's date in order to determine whether the persons
who produced the documents were agents of the parties and whether the document was
created in anticipation of litigation.
251 An evidentiary hearing allows the court to hear evidence about issues such as the degree
of anticipation of litigation of the document's preparers and the substantial need/undue
hardship claims of the party seeking discovery.
Virginia Law Review
Third, as noted above, certain institutional defendants have the
ability to structure their behavior in a way that maximizes work prod-
uct protection.2 52 This behavior often will include the increased use
of attorneys (including use of attorneys to do work that could be done
just as well by lay persons), making attorneys central to the dispute
resolution process even before a case is filed. 53 The cost of additional
attorneys is a direct cost for the litigants, but it also can be passed on
to shareholders and to consumers, thus becoming a cost to society.
Fourth, enhanced protection for attorney work product also may
impose a psychic harm on society. To the extent that work product
immunity serves only to protect attorneys as a special class, 2 54 whose
interests are more important than those of other groups, the work
product doctrine undercuts the egalitarian ambitions of American
society.255 The work product doctrine means that attorney thought
processes and documents are protected although client thought
processes and documents are not. This line makes it seem as though
work product immunity is a vehicle for benefiting the attorneys them-
selves rather than society as a whole.256 If this is all that can be said
of work product immunity, it harms the structure of a society that has
chosen to be governed by law even to recognize the doctrine.
Finally, the work product doctrine imposes another kind of non-
monetary cost on society. Work product protection sometimes results
in cases being settled or tried with parties to the cases missing relevant
information. 25 7 This in turn can lead to inaccurate outcomes. In
part, this will lead merely to errors in the division of the stakes among
252 See supra text accompanying notes 214-16.
253 See, e.g., Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367 (N.D. Ill.
1972) (stating that work product protection extends only to documents prepared by a non-
attorney at an attorney's request); Universal Vendors v. Candimat Co. of Am., 16 Fed. R.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1329, 1330 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (holding that an attorney's involvement with
the preparation of a document is necessary for work product protection). But see Basinger v.
Glacier Carriers, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 771 (M.D. Pa. 1985) (holding that under Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(3) a claims file prepared by an insurer before an attorney is involved is protected as work
product).
254 Arguments that work product is necessary to protect the morale or "tone" of the legal
profession explicitly adopt this view. See supra Part II.A.2.
255 See Wright & Graham, supra note 218, § 5422, at 673-74 ("In a society with egalitarian
pretensions, the creation and justification of a privilege to refuse to respond to a judicial
inquiry is essentially a political question; i.e., it is an allocation of power as between the various
components of the society.") (footnote omitted).
256 See Wells, supra note 10, at 695-96.
257 See supra Part III.A.1.
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the parties to a particular lawsuit.258 Lawsuits, however, also serve to
take existing rules and to apply them accurately in a way that influ-
ences future behavior. This might be called the "general deterrence
function" of litigation: "The more accurate the application of the
rules in particular cases, the more effect the rule itself will have in
influencing behavior."25 9 Therefore, when the work product doctrine
skews case outcomes by allowing information imbalance, it also
decreases the general deterrent value of litigation in society.
IV. LEGITIMATE WORK PRODUCT CONCERNS AND THE
SOLUTION
The work product doctrine, in its current form, is not necessary to
accomplish the outcomes sought by its Supreme Court creators in
Hickman. The necessary adversarial nature of the presentation of evi-
dence at trial can be achieved with a less combative model of informa-
tion gathering.26° Further, the cost to the litigants and to society of
the current work product doctrine far outweighs the benefit of any
increased preparation that it may produce.
A. Legitimate Concerns
There still are some legitimate concerns that would arise were the
work product doctrine to be eliminated entirely: issues of cost alloca-
tion, of timing, and of attorney harassment. Part of our concern
about eliminating work product immunity is not about adversary
preparation, morale, or any of the usual claims; it is about money.
Courts, legislatures, and litigants are unwilling to let the discovery
system function as a wealth-reallocation device. Thus they resist
allowing one party to benefit from work for which the other party has
paid.2 61 This adverseness to wealth-reallocation underlies, in part, the
courts' reluctance to give one party access to another party's comput-
erized litigation system, or to its insurer's investigation, or to its
258 See Easterbrook, supra note 76, at 359-60.
259 Id. at 359.
260 See Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and
Proposals for Change, 31 Vand. L. Rev. 1295 (1978) (discussing the costs associated with an
adversarial discovery system and proposed reforms).
261 See, e.g., Maryland ex rel. Montvila v. Pan-American Bus Lines, I F.R.D. 213, 215 (D.
Md. 1940) (stating that it is unreasonable to allow the discovery process to require defendant's
insurer to furnish investigation "free of cost" to plaintiff).
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experts' reports. Although we are in theory willing to redistribute
information relevant to a dispute, we are not always willing to make
one party bear the entire cost of that informational distribution, espe-
cially when the parties have roughly equal resources. A system that
eliminates the work product doctrine will have to address these issues
of cost allocation, either allowing disclosure despite the fact that an
opponent has borne the cost of preparation or ordering some payment
for the data, as the equities of the situation may require.
Another concern centers on issues of timing. At what point should
certain disclosures, for example, disclosures about a party's legal and
factual contentions, trial witnesses, or exhibits, have to be made dur-
ing the course of a lawsuit? As the system works now, we protect
parties from early disclosure of this information but find disclosure
entirely appropriate shortly before trial. Concerns about issues such
as issue freezing and litigation support systems really mask timing
questions. One commentator, discussing a trial court's decision to
protect IBM's computerized data, notes:
The judge accepted IBM's argument and denied plaintiffs' request
because he failed to realize that the real issue in the case was how soon
IBM would produce the documents. Plaintiffs had no interest in dis-
covering privileged information such as how IBM's system worked.
Plaintiffs only wanted IBM to use its computer so that it could obtain
the requested documents-documents that plaintiffs clearly were enti-
tled to see-more quickly than if plaintiffs searched for them
manually. 26
2
A system that eliminates the work product doctrine, then, will have to
make some decisions about the proper timing of disclosures.
Another concern with eliminating work product immunity is that
attorneys will harass opposing counsel during discovery. For exam-
ple, if even intangible opinion work product (that is, strategic attorney
thoughts that exist only in the attorney's brain) is discoverable, attor-
neys will be able to take opposing counsel's deposition and ask for all
of that information. The same will be true of intangible ordinary
work product: the attorney can be asked what he or she knows. Our
concerns about lack of professionalism and fears of "Rambo" litiga-
tion lead us to fear that such depositions could be exploited and used
262 Friedman, supra note 42, at 1475 (footnotes omitted).
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as a tool for harassment. These concerns also will need to be
addressed in a system that eliminates the work product doctrine.
B. The Solution
The ideal system will minimize the costs of any protection that is
required, spread the costs evenly among the parties, and address the
real remaining concerns directly. This requires the elimination of
both ordinary and opinion work product protections, replacing them
with cost-allocation rules, timing rules, and rules about relevance and
appropriate behavior. These rules, in turn, must be drafted so that
the protections provided benefit all groups of litigants equally and,
where appropriate, allocate resources so that no party is deprived of
relevant information due to lack of resources.
L Elimination of Ordinary Work Product Immunity
Some commentators already have called for the abolition of the
protection given to ordinary work product.263 These commentators
are correct. Ordinary work product immunity is not needed to pro-
tect the functioning of the adversary system. It tends to result in a net
loss of information rather than a net gain of information to the trial
process. And it is the type of work product most likely to benefit
certain classes of litigants at the expense of others.
There is some evidence that ordinary work product immunity can
be eliminated without causing the adversary system to come crashing
down. Pennsylvania, for example, has gone a long way in that direc-
tion. In 1978, Pennsylvania's work product rule was changed to
greatly restrict the scope of protected information. Parties may dis-
cover relevant information:
even though prepared in anticipation of litigation or trial by or for
another party or by or for that other party's representative, including
his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer or agent. The
discovery shall not include disclosure of the mental impressions of a
party's attorney or his conclusions, opinions, memoranda, notes or
summaries, legal research or legal theories. With respect to the repre-
sentative of a party other than the party's attorney, discovery shall
not include disclosure of his mental impressions, conclusions or opin-
263 See Cooper, supra note 8; LaFrance, supra note 5; Waits, supra note 9.
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ions respecting the value or merit of a claim or defense or respecting
strategy or tactics.2 4
This rule represents an attempt to protect only opinion work product
of attorneys and opinions of party representatives regarding value,
merit, strategy, or tactics.265 Ordinary work product is not pro-
tected.266 More than a decade of practice under this rule does not
appear to have damaged the quality of trials in Pennsylvania. 267
2. Elimination of Opinion Work Product Immunity
Leaving opinion work product immunity intact, however, under-
mines the Pennsylvania solution of eliminating ordinary work prod-
uct immunity. First, even if only opinion work product receives
protection, the problem of extensive litigation of work product issues
continues. The Pennsylvania courts, for example, have had to decide
numerous cases attempting to draw the line between ordinary and
opinion work product.268 It is reasonable to believe that the Penn-
sylvania experience is not unique. A change that eliminates only ordi-
264 Pa. R. Civ. P. 4003.3 (emphasis added).
265 See also Tate v. Philadelphia Say. Fund Soc'y, No. 2124, 1987 Phila. County Rptr.
LEXIS 28 (C.P. Ct. Phila. County Sept., 22, 1987) (rejecting a claim that a memorandum
written by a party's representative, noting that the stairs on which plaintiff fell were a "safety
hazard," disclosed the value or merit of a claim, defense, strategy, or tactic-the only type of
impressions protected by Pa. R. Civ. P. 4003.3).
266 Although a signed statement of a witness is always discoverable, an attorney's notes or
memoranda of an interview of a witness are protected. Pa. R. Civ. P. 4003.3 explanatory note
(1978 amendments). Like the current work product doctrine, this distinction tends to
encourage overuse of attorneys.
267 Texas courts have approached the problem differently by adopting an extremely
restrictive view of what qualifies as "in anticipation of litigation." Under Texas case law, work
done before a particular plaintiff has outwardly manifested an intention to file suit, such as by
sending a demand letter, is not "in anticipation of litigation." See Flores v. Fourth Ct. App.,
777 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tex. 1989); Texas Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Davis,
775 S.W.2d 467, 471 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989). This usually means that the defendant cannot
create work product until the plaintiffhas an attorney. It does not, however, solve the problem
of unequal resources leading to an unequal ability to investigate and to prepare a case for trial
after attorneys are hired, the problem of uneven impact of disputes about work product, or the
problem of the impact on the court system of work product disputes.
268 One Pennsylvania court described some of the litigation following the 1978 changes:
Despite [the rule's] clear directive, some litigants continued to be reluctant to surrender
information obtained by their own initiative. In many instances this was
understandable since the information sought was damaging to their claim or
defense .... This reluctance spawned a series of reported decisions" that the court
characterizes as "exotic" or "obtuse."
Tate, 1987 Phila. County Rptr. LEXIS, at *3.
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nary work product immunity solves some of the problem of hidden
facts but does not solve the problem of extensive litigation over the
parameters of work product protection.
Second, much opinion work product already is unprotected. Legal
theories and contentions applying law to fact must be revealed in
pleadings and discovery responses. Witness lists, exhibit lists, and
contentions must be revealed in pretrial conferences. The question is
what is wrong with allowing discovery of what is left.
What opinion work product is left? Some will be opinion work
product intertwined with ordinary work product, such as a memo
written by an attorney not only summarizing a conversation with a
witness, but also discussing the attorney's evaluation of the witness'
story. Most of what is contained in such memos are facts that should
be available to all litigants. The fact that attorney thought processes
were involved in choosing what to write down does not make those
facts any less relevant or less important. Although some jurisdictions
might want to allow the excision of purely evaluative comments (e.g.
"bad witness" or "forgetful" or "appears to be lying") such efforts are
ill-advised for two reasons. First, excision would again lead to volu-
minous litigation attempting to draw the line between facts and opin-
ions. Second, those opinions are really shorthand summaries of less
tangible facts that are relevant to the credibility of the underlying
facts or to the possibility that the person interviewed knows other, less
helpful information. For example, "bad witness" may mean that the
person's testimony is not inherently believable; it may mean the per-
son's body language projects a lack of truthfulness; it may mean the
person is sympathetic to the opponent. Whatever information these
evaluative comments reflect is relevant and should be discoverable.
Some opinion work product will be legal memoranda reflecting the
attorney's research of substantive or procedural issues raised by the
case. Although some kind of cost allocation might be appropriate
here, there is no value in hiding relevant legal theories or authori-
ties.269 Some opinion work product will be trial preparation that goes
beyond what must now be included in pretrial orders, such as outlines
of opening statements, witness examinations, and closing arguments.
Some will be intangible work product such as an attorney's opinion as
269 Memoranda addressed to a client raise issues of attorney-client privilege that are beyond
the scope of this Article.
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to the settlement value of a case or the veracity of a witness. Some of
this may need protection; most does not. The discoverability of this
information would not undermine the viability of a traditional adver-
sary trial, or of the settlement process. I do not, therefore, advocate
protecting it. A jurisdiction that finds discovery of particular items
too distasteful to stomach, or more likely to lead to disputes than to
helpful information, however, may want to bar the discovery of cer-
tain specific types of pure opinion work product. But the desire to
withhold some of this information from opposing counsel does not
justify a discovery exemption as broad as our current concepts'of
opinion work product.
In addition, some opinion work product should be discoverable on
principle. For example, the process by which witnesses are prepared
for trial or deposition testimony has potential to mold those witnesses'
testimony in ways that will be hard to impeach without information
about the preparation.2 70 For example, expert consultants now pro-
vide advice about wardrobe and body language; witnesses practice
their testimony for the video camera and review their performances;
rehearsals before mock juries allow attorneys to adjust their cases to
"what sells; 2 7 1 attorneys talk to the Witnesses about ways to answer
certain kinds of questions.2 71 Yet the process of preparing these wit-
nesses undoubtedly reflects attorney strategy to at least some
extent,73 and the work product doctrine will prevent the discovering
party from being able to test adequately the credibility of these wit-
nesses. This portion of work product protection also should be
abolished.
270 See supra text accompanying notes 172-75.
271 Diane B. Beckham, Voir Dire Voodoo, Tex. Law., Apr. 30, 1990, at 1.
272 The American Bar Foundation study, for example, asked the attorneys surveyed
whether
"the way you have prepared a client or witness to be deposed ever resulted in other
parties not learning something of arguable significance from your client or witness
during his deposition?...
Ninety-five percent of the responding attorneys (163 of 171) said that on one or more
occasions opposing counsel had failed to learn something arguably significant during
the deposition of a witness they had prepared."
Brazil, supra note 59, at 819.
273 But see Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Banales, 773 S.W.2d 693, 694 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989)
(stating that videotape of practice deposition not per se work product; trial court should review
it to determine whether the tape revealed attorney strategy).
1578 [Vol. 77:1515
Rethinking Work Product
3. Rules Directly Addressing the Remaining Concerns
If we eliminate both ordinary and opinion work product immunity,
what should we substitute? Rather than use broad rules that pre-
sumptively protect certain kinds of documents, we should substitute
rules that directly address our concerns. Some problems could be
addressed by a relevance rule. Others would require rules directed at
the problem itself. If, for example, a jurisdiction were worried about
fair allocation of the costs of discovery, it could adopt a cost-alloca-
tion rule. If a jurisdiction were concerned about timing rules, it could
use timing rules. If a jurisdiction were concerned about harassment,
it could prohibit certain behaviors.
Discovery relevance is very broad, allowing a discovering party
access to any nonprivileged information that is "reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. ' 274 Yet some of the
work product that a system might want to protect is arguably not
relevant even under this definition, or could be specifically defined as
nondiscoverable. For example, an attorney's trial notebook, contain-
ing outlines of witness testimony or opening statements, could be said
not to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.275 Similarly, an
attorney's opinion about the settlement value of a case might not be
relevant in the discovery sense, although the facts underlying the
attorney's opinion might be relevant and discoverable.276 In other
words, if a jurisdiction could identify specific kinds of attorney prepa-
ration that it believed should not be discoverable, it could define them
as not relevant (or, alternatively, could create a narrow and specific
privilege for them) rather than use the "loose canon of work product
immunity" to protect those few items.277 The kind of information
protected, such as those noted above, should be the kind apt to be
held equally by plaintiffs and defendants, by individual litigants and
by institutional litigants, by one-shot litigants and by repeat litigants.
274 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
275 Timing rules may eliminate the discoverability of trial notebooks as well, as many
attorneys do not even compile their trial notebooks until immediately before the trial begins.
A case that is unexpectedly continued to a later date, however, might raise the issue of trial
notebook discovery.
276 See Wells, supra note 10, at 690-91.
277 Id. at 691.
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Some jurisdictions already have explicit rules about cost alloca-
tion.278 Under an approach that looks directly at cost allocation, the
question is not whether information is available but to what extent the
discovering party must share the opponent's cost of having developed
the information. Such a rule, like all rules that require the balancing
of competing interests, would create problems of consistency and line
drawing. It therefore would allow discovery disputes to continue. I
believe, however, it would lead to fewer disputes than the current
work product rule, and those disputes would be aimed directly at the
issue that concerns the court. The more specific the rule could be
about the factors to be considered and the weight to be given them,
the more consistency and the less litigation would result. Further, the
rules would have to take into consideration the relative resources of
the parties when making decisions about cost allocation.
When the real issue is timing, the courts should recognize that they
are making decisions about timing. Whether we are concerned about
issue freezing or about allowing the parties sufficient time to compile
and to analyze information, a timing rule would address those con-
cerns more directly than a rule that purports to decide whether infor-
mation will be available at all.
Some such timing rules are already in place. For example, the Fed-
eral Courts Study Committee reported that many federal courts
already use case management techniques for discovery issues, includ-
ing decisions about the proper timing of various kinds of discovery.27 9
Also, many courts have treated work product questions as timing
issues280 in the area of pretrial orders by providing that a party will
not be compelled to identify trial witnesses early in the lawsuit but
will be compelled to identify those trial witnesses a reasonable time
before trial.281 Similarly, some courts have required parties taking
depositions to identify a few days beforehand those exhibits they
278 Illinois, for example, provides in its work product rule that the court "may apportion the
cost involved in originally securing the discoverable material, including when appropriate a
reasonable attorney's fee, in such manner as is just." Ill. S. Ct. R. 201(b)(2); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(4) (allocating expert witness costs).
279 Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee to the Judicial Conference, Apr. 2, 1990,
at 99-100.
280 Cf. Developments, supra note 13, at 1040-43 (recognizing the interaction between the
discovery rules and the pretrial conference rules).
281 See, e.g., City of Long Beach v. Superior Ct., 134 Cal. Rptr. 468, 476 n.5 (Ct. App. 1976)
("Where pretrial rules provide for the exchange of witness lists, the objection to ...
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intend to use in the deposition proceedings, characterizing the deci-
sion as a "case management" technique rather than as a discovery
order.28 2 Greater recognition that work product disputes are often
merely timing disputes would allow these decisions to be made more
clearly.
Some proposed changes in the federal discovery rules embody tim-
ing concepts for work product issues (although without explicitly
changing the scope of work product immunity). The Federal Rules
Advisory Committee's most recent working draft of amendments to
Rule 26(a) approaches certain work product issues by ordering differ-
ent disclosures at different times. For example, the rule as drafted
would require all parties to identify automatically all persons likely to
have significant information, to describe all significant documents,
and to explain their computation of damage claims within thirty days
of defendant's answer.28 3 At least thirty days before trial, parties also
must identify trial witnesses and trial exhibits.284 Timing rules, then,
are already a part of our discovery scheme. Thinking about work
product issues in terms of timing instead of in terms of discoverability
would cause little dislocation.
What is not acceptable is a timing rule that preserves surprise at
trial. Modem procedural systems purport to have eliminated surprise
as a virtue,285 and so timing rules should take care not to let surprise
return through the back door. The rules should provide flexibility of
disclosure within the pretrial period, but not flexibility to keep infor-
mation secret forever, or secret until it emerges as evidence at trial.2 86
interrogatories [seeking a list of witnesses and summary of their testimony] becomes merely an
objection to the timing of the disclosure.").
282 In re San Juan DuPont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 859 F.2d 1007, 1017 (1st Cir. 1988)
("Requiring preidentification merely moves up the schedule, accelerating disclosures which
would inevitably take place.").
283 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (Unapproved Working Draft Mar. 1991, at 429-30).
284 Id. at 431.
285 Permitting the parties to use discovery devices tends to ensure that all evidence will be
unearthed and that concealment of relevant information and materials will be
minimized. Such full disclosure will tend both to prevent unfair surprise at trial and to
reduce the number of judgments which do not accurately reflect the actual state of the
facts.
Developments, supra note 13, at 945 (footnote omitted).
286 There may be a limited number of occasions in which a party could convince the trial
court that a real possibility of dishonesty exists if impeaching evidence must be revealed before
trial. This situation, however, would be the exception rather than the rule and would require a
strong showing on the part of the party resisting discovery.
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As one commentator notes, arguments that evidence "should be
secret so that it can be sprung upon the witness without prior warning
at trial. .. are very near to being arguments against the general the-
ory of discovery itself, in favor of an element of surprise at trial-an
argument, which... was lost a long time ago." 2 7
Concerns about harassment also should be dealt with directly
rather than indirectly. As noted above, some opportunities to
examine opposing counsel could be eliminated by defining manifesta-
tions of pure strategy as irrelevant. If relevance concepts leave open
the possibility of harassment, narrow rules governing attorney behav-
ior could be drafted.28 ' These rules would apply evenly to all parties
and their attorneys. In addition, the ability of opposing counsel to
"repay" a harassing deposition would be a deterrent to this kind of
discovery abuse. Again, rules about harassment, if that is the con-
cern, would be preferable to rules prohibiting discovery in the name of
preventing harassment.
Rules prohibiting taking the deposition of opposing counsel would
be clearer and easier to enforce. Such rules, however, could result in
the loss of relevant information when counsel is the only party with
knowledge of certain facts. A "no deposition of counsel" rule also
could favor parties able to employ multiple attorneys and would tend
to motivate parties who could afford to do so to overutilize attorneys
as investigators in order to protect information from discovery.
Therefore, although a "no harassment" rule would be harder to
enforce, I prefer it to a "no deposition of counsel" rule. In order to
avoid numerous disputes in this area, however, the rule should strictly
limit a party's ability to depose opposing counsel, hence limiting the
tendency of this situation to provoke litigation.
CONCLUSION
The discovery process was designed to correct unequal distribution
of information and to ensure that the trier of fact has access to all
relevant information. The work product doctrine prevents the discov-
ery process from functioning as it was designed to ftmction. Instead,
287 Bryson P. Burnham, Confidentiality and the Corporate Lawyer: The Attorney-Client
Privilege and "Work Product" in Illinois, 56 Ill. B.J. 542, 553 (1968) (footnote omitted).
288 See, e.g., Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 (1983); Texas Lawyer's Creed-
A Mandate for Professionalism, in Texas Rules of Court 497 (West 1989).
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work product protection hides relevant information, increases costs,
and exaggerates the inequality of wealth and information of the par-
ties to a lawsuit. Further, the work product doctrine fails to achieve
its own objectives of assuring the best and most complete possible
adversarial presentation of evidence at trial. These objectives would
be better served by much narrower rules that would address real con-
cerns and would have an equal impact on the parties.
The work product doctrine was created by the Supreme Court in
1947. We are fast approaching the half-century mark of allowing
trials with lopsided access to information in the name of attorney dili-
gence. The courts' project over the next five years should be elimina-
tion, not celebration, of work product immunity.
